It just seems ever so obvious that we are affected by the world: when I place my hand next to the fire, it becomes hot, and when I plunge it into the bucket of ice water, it becomes cold. What goes for physical changes also goes for at least some mental changes: when Felix the Cat leaps upon my lap, my lap not only becomes warm, but I also feel this warmth, and when he purrs, I hear his purr. It seems ever so obvious, in other words, that perception (at least, and at least under ordinary conditions) is a matter of being affected by the agency of perceptible objects. Who would ever wish to deny such an ever so evident doctrine?

Yet Durand of St.-Pourçain does, or at least he seems to. Thomas Reid’s nineteenth-century editor, Sir William Hamilton, writes, as a result, and with not a little praise, that “Durandus, I may notice, seems to deny, like Reid […] absolutely and without reserve, the affection of sense by the agency of the object.” Indeed, Durand declares that “sensing and thinking do not come about in us from [perceptible] objects as efficient causes,” and he holds it as absurd to suppose that sensible qualities, in virtue of which sense objects purportedly affect our senses, might be able to do just that. Hence, it certainly looks as if Durand rejects the ever so evident doctrine that, at least under ordinary circumstances, perceptible objects are the causes of our perceptive acts.

One of the theses that I want to defend in this article is that Durand does not reject this thesis, but rather he rejects a nearby one—call it affectionism—according to which perception is a matter of being affected by perceptible objects. Durand rejects affectionism, but he does not reject the doctrine that the object is the cause of a perceptive act. Durand establishes and defends a distinction between efficient causes and what he calls sine qua non causes. To say that X is an efficient cause of Y is to say something more than that X is a sine qua non cause of Y. Very roughly, the relation of sine qua non causality is what we would recognize nowadays as a relation of causal dependence. By contrast, the relation of efficient causality is causal dependence plus something more. More precisely, an efficient cause induces or impresses a ‘form’ upon some passive recipient. The campfire efficiently causes the hot dog to become hot, and this means that it induces or impresses the ‘form’ of heat upon the hot dog. The hot dog’s being hot does not simply depend upon the presence of a hot campfire; it depends upon it and something more.

Now, Durand does not reject the notion of efficient causality. In common with almost all

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3 DURAND, Super Sent. (A), II, 3, 5, ed. F. RETUCCI, Leuven 2012, p. 156: “[…] sentire et intelligere non sunt in nobis effective ab obiecto.” All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I have freely changed the Latin orthography and punctuation.

4 DURAND, Super Sent. (A), II, 3, 5, p. 152, quoted below in nt. 10.
of his contemporaries he would accept, for instance, this analysis of the heating of the hot dog. He, however, holds that it is inappropriate to characterize the object of our perceptive acts as efficient causes of those acts; rather such objects are mere sine qua non causes. Our perceptive acts depend upon the presence of their objects. Affectionists, by contrast, hold that our perceptive acts depend upon the presence of their objects and something more, namely, that when the object is present to the senses, it also affects the senses and so induces or impresses somehow its ‘form’ upon the senses. It is this doctrine, then, thatDurand rejects and not the doctrine that objects are the causes of our perceptive acts.

This article has three parts. In the first part, I will sketch, briefly, what motivates Durand to reject affectionism. In the second part, I will take up the affectionist doctrine as defended by Durand’s older contemporary at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfrey maintains an extreme form of affectionism: the object of all our mental acts (not just perceptions, but also thoughts and desires) is the efficient cause of those acts, or, in other words, all mental acts (not just perception) come about owing to the affection of the relevant mental faculty by the agency of the object. As it turns out, Godfrey develops a celebrated argument against the thesis that the object is not the efficient cause but a mere sine qua non cause. Hence his position offers a challenge to Durand’s position, a challenge, I argue in the third part, Durand meets.

1. Against Affectionism

Durand thinks that there are good reasons to be suspicious of Godfrey’s view and, in general, affectionism. In this section, I will discuss two arguments Durand advances against such a view. The first appeals to facts about language, and the second argument is based upon the (more mysterious) notion of nobility.

1.1. Language

Godfrey had argued at length that verbs of cognition (for instance, ‘to hear’, ‘to see’, ‘to think’, and so on) are active in form but passive in meaning, that is to say, such verbs pick out passions or affections on the side of the subjects of the sentences in which they occur in the active form and not, contrary to grammatical appearance, actions. For instance, Godfrey

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6 See, for instance, GODFREY OF FONTAINES, QUODL. IX, 19, p. 280: “[…] illud quod hoc verbo [sc. ‘intelligere’] signifcatur est vere passio intellectus possibilis et sic vere in ipso subiective; sed […] illa passio significatur per modum activum verbalem et per modum actionis […].]” See also Ibid., pp. 277-280.
would analyse the following sentence as follows.

(1) Socrates is seeing Felix’s colour.

The active verb (‘is seeing’) is active in form but passive in meaning: it picks out a passion on the side of Socrates, for Socrates’ act of seeing is in fact a passion, a kind of affection of Socrates owing to the agency of the object (Felix’s colour).

Suppose that Godfrey is right: verbs of cognition are active in form but passive in meaning. Durand reasons that if this were true, then the passive form of those verbs should be taken to be passive in form but active in meaning. After all, when a sentence is changed so that the mood of its verb is switched up, any number of prescriptivist rules about things being said in the passive voice will be violated, but nothing much about what was said will be changed. “Socrates is hitting Plato” means, more or less, the same thing as “Plato is being hit by Socrates.” Hence, Durand reasons, Godfrey must be committed to the following analysis of the following sentence.

(2) Felix’s colour is being seen by Socrates.

The passive verb (‘is being seen’) is passive in form but active in meaning: it picks out an action on the side of Felix’s colour.

But even if we allow language its quirks and so allow that the active form of certain verbs are, although active in form, nevertheless passive in meaning, it is a stretch to suppose—so says Durand—that the passive form of verbs of cognition are passive in form yet active in meaning. Durand identifies two problems with such a situation. First, we would then be committed to the thesis that I see the object because the object is being seen, for a patient is affected because an agent is affecting it and not the other way around; but our intuitions about sentences like (2) seem to run in the other direction: Felix’s colour is being seen because Socrates is seeing it and not the other way around. Second, it would follow that Felix’s colour’s action would be more noble than Socrates’ act (passion) of vision, because actions are more noble than passions; but—Durand is quick to point out—Socrates’ act of vision (whatever that might be) has got to be more noble than Felix’s colour’s action (whatever that might be), since Socrates’ act of vision is living whereas Felix’s colour’s action is not, and what is living is more noble than what is not.
1.2. Nobility

And so we arrive at Durand’s second basic argumentative strategy. Durand holds that affectionists, like Godfrey, are committed to a violation of a very basic causal principle: what is less noble cannot affect what is more noble. Durand considers two ways of understanding this principle. On the one hand, it might mean that a less noble power cannot act upon a more noble power. According to most medieval philosophers, in any causal transaction, there is an active power in an agent in virtue of which it acts and a passive power in the patient in virtue of which it is acted upon, and the former must be more noble than the latter. As Durand puts it:

Even though the agent is not always better than the patient in connection with what it is as suppositum—for instance, fire is not better than a human being upon whom it acts—nevertheless it is without exception necessary that in connection with the principle in virtue of which the agent acts it be better and more noble than the patient in connection with the principle in virtue of which the patient is affected. For instance, the heat of the fire in virtue of which it acts is more noble than the dryness or wetness of a human being in virtue of which he is affected by the fire. However, a sensible quality in virtue of which a sense object acts upon a sense (as they say) is not more noble or more perfect than the sensitive power. And the same goes for the intellect’s object and the intellective power. Hence, the sense object or the object of intellect cannot cause in sense or intellect a sensing or thinking.10

On the other hand, the nobility principle might mean that that in virtue of which a thing brings about an effect must be at least as noble as (if not more noble than) the effect, at least in cases where that thing causes the effect on its own. But, according to Godfrey, in the case of sensitive cognition sense objects on their own are supposed to be able to bring about perceptive acts in virtue of the sensible qualities which such sense objects possess. Yet, once more, perceptive acts are more noble than sensible qualities, since the former are living and the latter are not.11

1.3. Summary

In sum, affectionists like Godfrey are committed to a view that not only runs against ordinary

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10 Durand, Super Sent. (A), II, 3, 5, p. 152: “[…] quamvis agens non semper sit praestantius patiente quantum ad illud quod est secundum suppositum—puta ignis non est praestantior homine in quem agit—tamen oportet universaliter agens quantum ad principium quo agit esse praestantius et nobilius patiente quantum ad illud quo patient patitur, sicut nobilior est caliditas ignis per quam agit quam sit siccitas vel humiditas hominis per quam ab igne patitur. Sed quidam sensibilis per quam sensibile agit in sensum (ut isti dicunt) non est aliquid nobilius et perfectius potestia sensitiva, et idem intelligitur de objecto intellectus et potestia intellectiva. Ergo objectum sensus et intellectus non potest causare in sensu et intellectu sentire et intelligere.”

11 Durand, Super Sent. (A), II, 3, 5, pp. 154-155: “Tertio quia omnis causa quae non est agens solum instrumentaliter sed principaliter habet formam per quam agit quae est eiusdem rationis cum ea quam inducit, si sit agens univocum, vel est perfectior ea, si sit agens aequivocum. Sed objectum sensus secundum istos est causans sentire in sensu non solum instrumentaliter (ut posset dici de objecto intellectus ratione intellectus agentis) sed principaliter. Ergo sensible, cum sit agens aequivocum, haberet in se formam et actum nobiliorem quam sit sentire, quod est absurdum.”
language but also flies in the face of certain intuitions (medieval authors at least had) about the nobility of things. Of course, such arguments do not constitute knock-down arguments against affectionism. Indeed, arguments based upon nobility might strike us as implausible or at least questionable. (Why should a living thing be more noble than a thing that is not?) And, although appeals to ordinary language have a distinguished pedigree and lasting legacy, the fact remains that Latin is *ad placitum* and so who is to say how far ordinary language can carry an argument? However, such arguments (and especially the nobility arguments) did strike medieval authors as compelling. Hence, such arguments might best be viewed as motivational, and they indeed did motivate Durand to (re)consider the alternatives. The better theory of cognition, in other words, will be the one that preserves certain (medieval) intuitions and also explains what needs to be explained: namely, the occurrence of a cognitive act owing to what seems to be the object as efficient cause.

2. Godfrey’s Defence of Affectionism

Godfrey, whose scholarly career in Paris ends about the same time Durand’s begins, defends the thesis that cognition is passive and its object an efficient cause due primarily to his metaphysical commitments. He is perhaps most well known to scholars of medieval philosophy as a tireless advocate of the so-called act-potency axiom, according to which nothing one and the same can be in both act and potency with respect to the same thing at the same time (the most general form of Aristotle’s *dictum* that what is moved is moved by another (*omnia quod movetur ab alio movetur*). Godfrey decides that this axiom ought to be considered so certain and fundamental as to be inviolable and universal in scope, and so it

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12 Thomas Reid, for instance, will adduce a similar argument almost five hundred years later. See T. Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, ed. D. Brookes, University Park, PA 2002, p. 21: “In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification, such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. It seems therefore to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs.”


comes as little surprise to find him appealing to it when he takes up issues that pertain to the subject-matter of psychology. Godfrey’s reasoning can be put as follows. It is evident that a cognizant subject, or more precisely, a given cognitive power in a cognizant subject, is not always engaged in cognitive activity, or, in other words, it is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. For instance, Socrates, a cognizant subject, has a power for sight and a power for thought, each of which is sometimes engaged in its associated cognitive activity and sometimes not. Granted this, then, one might well wonder what actualizes a given cognitive power, that is, what reduces a cognitive power from potency to act. What reduces, for instance, Socrates’ power for sight from potency to act? (In what follows I will often talk of an item being reduced from potency to act or of something reducing it to act; this is a very special and technical use of ‘reduce’, a literal translation of the scholastic Latin ‘reducere’.) Since whatever it is that reduces a passive power from potency to act is to be considered an efficient cause, the question

“What reduces Socrates’ faculty for seeing from potency to act?”

is the same as

“What is the efficient cause of Socrates’ vision?”

On the surface, there are three options: (1) it reduces itself; (2) an item outside it reduces it; (3) both it and this item reduce it (as two necessary causes, jointly sufficient).


Godfrey and other authors also sometimes speak of a power being actuated (actuare), educed (educere), drawn out (extrahere), or, more simply, transitioning (exire) from potency to act.

In fact, Godfrey considers (and rejects) a fourth and fifth option: (4) that both the power and a ‘disposition’ (species) added to the power reduce it; (5) that both a disposition added to the power and some other item reduce the power. He rejects (4) on the grounds that it would violate the act-potency axiom in the same way that (1) and (3) would, since the power would still reduce itself from potency to act. He rejects (5) on the grounds that such an added disposition would be superfluous. See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. IX, 19, pp.
cognitive power cannot reduce itself, neither (1) on its own nor (3) together with some other item, because then, Godfrey reasons, the act-potency axiom will be violated. It will be violated because, as I’ll spell out in some more detail below, a cognitive power is (at least) passive with respect to its cognitive act since it receives it, and this much, Godfrey reasons, everyone would admit; but nothing can be both passive and active with respect to the same thing at the same time, for then it would be in potency and act at the same time with respect to the same thing.

Hence, it has to be the case (2) that something outside of it reduces it. The most plausible candidate here is, of course, the object and so Godfrey maintains that the object (and it alone) is the efficient cause of the cognitive act, reducing the cognitive power from potency into act.21 Hence, we are, Godfrey will go on to insist at length, in fact totally passive with respect to cognition and not at all active,22 grammatical appearances and inchoate intuitions about nobility notwithstanding.

2.1. Godfrey’s Achilles Argument

One way to appreciate Godfrey’s position is to look at how he defends it against attack. We are fortunate here for many people attacked it.23 One of the most famous was Henry of Ghent, Godfrey’s older contemporary at Paris, who sparred with Godfrey on this topic (with a special focus on the will) in a series of public debates that spanned a baker’s dozen years or so.24 On Henry’s view, the object of the will—something presented to the will by the intellect—does not actualize the will’s potency in the manner of an efficient cause but rather it is to

21 See, for instance, GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodl. IX, 19, p. 276: “Objectum ergo intelligibile habet rationem moventis et agentis respectu intellectus possibilis educens ipsum de potestia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum illud […] Objectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et moventis…” See also Quodl. XIII, 3, ed. J. HOFFMANS, Leuven 1935, vol. 5, p. 193: “[…] actus potentiarum animae qui dicuntur quaedam operationes non sunt effective a potentia animae in qua sunt sed potius ab objecto”; Quodl. X, 14, ed. J. HOFFMANS, Leuven 1931, vol. 4, p. 379: “Dicendum quod nec voluntas nec intellectus proprie movent se sive educunt se de potentia ad actum aliquem, sed per se moventur ab objecto. Objectum enim respectu potentiae cuiuscumque animalis non habet rationem moti vel passi; nec est sicut materia vel subjunctum operationis ipsius potentiae ut potentia actum suum in illud vel circa illud exerceat; sed se habet in ratione moventis et agentis secundum cius formam et actum habet etiam speciem et formam ipse actus potentiae; quod non posset esse nisi haberet rationem moventis et agentis ut causa per se et propter quam non ut causa per accidens et sine qua non.”

22 See, for instance, GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodl. IX, 19, p. 276: “[…] et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passivi et receptivi.”

23 While most authors took Godfrey to be correct about sensitive cognition, many took him to be wrong about intuitive cognition, for Godfrey maintains that the intelligible object alone (without the causal aid of the so-called agent intellect) brings about an intellective act. Many more took Godfrey to be wrong about acts of the will. In addition to Henry of Ghent (discussed below), see, for instance and among many others, JOHN OF JANDUN, QQ. De an., III, 31; JOHN DUNSCOTUS, Ord., I, 3, 3, 1-3; QQ. Met., IX, 14; Rep., II, 25; Lec., II, 25; JOHN BURIDAN, QQ. Eth. Nic., II, 3; HERVAEUS NATALIS, Super Sent., II, 17, 2; JOHN BACHANTORPE, Super Sent., Prologus, 2, 4; GONSALVE OF SPAIN, QQ. disputatae, esp. q. 3 et 8; and GUIDO TERRENI, Quodl. II, 13.

be thought of as a so-called *sine qua non* cause, a mere necessary condition without which there would not be volition. It is not the object but the will itself that actualizes its own potency, for if acts of the will were caused by something other than the will, then they would not be free.  

Hence, at least in the case of some mental acts—namely, volitions—the act-potency axiom does not apply.

During the course of this debate, Godfrey developed and refined a kind of master argument both in defence of his own position and against a position like Henry’s. John Duns Scotus, in his own recapitulation of the debate at the turn of the new century, labels this argument (or at least important bits of it) the ‘Achilles’ argument, meaning that it drives at the core theoretical problem with *sine qua non* causality and any future proponent of the theory must face up to it if they wish to defend the notion. The *Achilles argument*, as I will be calling it, is complex, having a number of components or steps. I think it is best to view it as having the following four steps.

1. Let’s begin with the alternative: a psychological power (in this case, the will) is an active not a passive power. But this seems impossible. An active power is by definition (at least Aristotle’s definition) a power or ability to bring about a change in something else (*potentia activa est principium transmutandi aliud inquantum aliud*).

2. It follows from the necessity principle that our various mental powers cannot be active powers, for when Socrates wills or sees something, nothing else, outside of Socrates, is affected.

The necessity principle is not simply true by definition. Appealing to another principle to

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29 The necessity principle also, of course, applies to passive powers: if P is acted upon (or affected), then it is necessary that there be an A (somehow distinct from P) which is acting upon or affecting P. See *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, 1, 220, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 134, 89: “Potentia passiva est principium transmutandi ab altero in quantum ab altero.”
be found in Aristotle—call this the actualism principle—Godfrey argues that in order for an agent to make a patient F, that agent must itself be actually F.\textsuperscript{30} For instance, in order for the campfire to make the hot dog hot, the campfire must itself be hot. Hence, if an item were able to reduce itself from potency to act—from being able to be hot to being hot—then it would have to be already in act—already hot—in the first place, and so it will be in potency and act with respect to the same thing at the same time, a patent violation of the act-potency axiom.

(2) We might be tempted to reject the necessity principle.\textsuperscript{31} However, if we do and so allow that an item can reduce itself from potency to act, we face another problem, based upon another Aristotelian principle, call it the sufficiency principle:

[Sufficiency Principle] Whenever a sufficient agent is present to a sufficient patient, the action will come about.\textsuperscript{32}

When the hot dog is next to the campfire, the campfire will make the hot dog hot. But the will (on Henry’s view) is taken to be both the sufficient agent and sufficient patient of an act of willing. Yet we do not always will (nor see, hear, and so on).

This problem, known in the literature as the problem of omniactivity, compels us to admit that there is some other cause over and above the will that is necessary in order for a volition to occur when it occurs.\textsuperscript{33} What might this something else be? Once more the most obvious

\textsuperscript{30} 
\textbf{ARISTOTLE, Physica, III, 2, 202a9-12. See GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodl.-V, 11, p. 41: “…ad hoc quod aliquid agat vel producat aliquid sufficit quod sit ens …in actu tale quale est alius in potentia…” See also Quodl.-XIII, 2, p. 19 and Quodl.-VI, 7, pp. 152-54.}

\textsuperscript{31} 
Indeed, many people did, by way of a rejection of the actualism principle. Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and others argued that, rather, in order for an agent to make a patient F, that agent need not be formally (or actually) F, but rather it need only be virtually F. For instance, according to medieval authors, the Sun is not actually hot—it does not have the form of heat inhering in it; yet the Sun is able to make other things hot owing to the fact that it is virtually hot. See, for instance, \textit{JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Lect., I, 3, 3, 2-3, 403, Città del Vaticano 1960, vol. 16, p. 8000; Ord., I, 3, 3, 2, 513, ed. P. BALIĆ, Città del Vaticano 1954, vol. 3, p. 8000. Rep., II, 25, un., 12, Parisii 1884 (= ed. Wadding/Vivès), vol. 23, p. 129a-b; and \textit{HENRY OF GHENT, Quodl.-XIII, 11, p. 131; Quodl.-X, 9, pp. 221, 230. Godfrey recognizes this move and rejects it as well, arguing (1) that only items, like the Sun, which bring about effects in other things, can (perhaps) be said to violate the actualism principle, and (2) that even if something like the will were able to violate the actualism principle, this would entail a violation of another principle: that nothing can reduce itself from a more perfect state to a less perfect state, for agents that virtually have forms are more noble than agents that actually (or formally) have them. See esp. \textit{GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodl.-VI, 7, pp. 150-51.}}

\textsuperscript{32} 
\textbf{ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica, IX, 5, 1048a5-7. See GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodl.-X, 14, p. 381: “[…] praesentibus activo et passivo consurgit action […]”}

\textsuperscript{33} 
\textbf{See, for instance, GODFREY OF FONTAINES, Quodl.-VI, 7, pp. 151-52: “Praeterea quando activum per se est praesens passive per se sequitur actio et in hoc excludum omne impeditivum, ut patet per Philosophum nono Metaphysicæ. Si ergo in voluntate ponatur activum et passivum quae semper sibi sunt praesentia quia sunt id ipsum (ut dicit ista positio) vel sunt unum subiecto (ut dicit alia), sequitur actio et huic non potest praestari impedimentum. Quid enim potest impediire quod idem non sit praesens sibi ipsi?”}

\textsuperscript{34} 
candidate is the object. Of course, we need not take the object to be a necessary efficient cause. This is, presumably, what Henry of Ghent and others who endorse the notion of *sine qua non* causality mean when they claim that the object is a cause but not an efficient cause: the efficient cause is the will which reduces itself from potency to act and affects itself *if and only if* the object is present.

We now arrive at the core theoretical problem—the Achilles proper—with the notion of a *sine qua non* cause. In Godfrey’s lights, such a view is mysterious and *ad hoc*.

(3) It is mysterious because Aristotle recognizes but four kinds of causes: the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final. Since the subject and not the object is the recipient of the thought or volition, the subject and not the object is the material cause. Nor is it plausible to insist that the object is the formal or final cause, and since the object is explicitly not an efficient cause, it would seem that it is not a cause at all. In other words, what *kind* of cause is the object? If there is a fifth kind of cause over and above Aristotle’s gang of four, I would like to hear a bit more about it. Hence, the notion of *sine qua non* causality is mysterious.\(^{35}\)

(4) The other core problem with the notion of *sine qua non* causality is that it seems rather *ad hoc*, a ready-made solution to the problem. Henry of Ghent seems committed to the claim that *sine qua non* causality applies *only* in the case of the will: when the will changes, this is not owing to an extrinsic efficient cause but rather it is owing to a mere *sine qua non* cause; yet in *all other* cases, when something changes, this is owing not to a mere *sine qua non* cause but rather to an extrinsic efficient cause. Hence, a given change is to be treated as a case either of (ordinary) efficient causality or (special) *sine qua non* causality. In other words, Henry seems to be committed to a disjunctive analysis of causation. However, as with any disjunctive analysis, unless we provide a good reason for choosing one or the other of the disjuncts, our theory will be *ad hoc*, and Godfrey, for one, does not think that Henry has given us such a reason.\(^{36}\) To put it somewhat dramatically, if we admit that there are *sine qua non* causes, such that P, in the presence of A, becomes φ (whereas P not in the presence of A does not) and that this is owing to (i) P’s self-affection and (ii) A as a mere *sine qua non* cause, then we might as well claim that whenever it looks as if any item whatsoever becomes φ owing to some other item as efficient cause, in fact what has occurred is that the former item became φ owing to (i) its own self-affection and (ii) the latter item as a mere *sine qua non* cause. As Godfrey puts it:

If this can be said about the will, then with equal ease and with reason one might deny that there is any active power distinct from the passive power and so claim that each and every thing moves itself from potency to act… But then how will one prove that the branch or a body becomes hot thanks to fire? Rather, one can say that it makes itself hot when the fire—as *sine qua non* cause—is present.\(^{37}\)

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35 See, for instance, **Godfrey of Fontaines**, *Quodl.-XV*, 4, pp. 24-25: “Si autem sit causa sine qua non aliquid faciens ad effectum, quero in quod genere causae se habet? Constat quod non in genere causae formalis, quia obiectum non est forma actus volendi; nec etiam est causa materialis, quia obiectum non est subiectum in quo recipiatur actus volendi […] nec etiam in genere causae finalis solum, quia finis non est quod dirigit sed in quod inclinatio dirigatur […] Ergo relinquitur quod si obiectum est causa sine qua non aliquid faciens ad effectum, quod sit causa effectiva in motione voluntatis et quod effective movet voluntatem.”

36 See, for instance, **Godfrey of Fontaines**, *Quodl.-VI*, 7, p. 158: “Non est enim dare quare in unum exeat potius quam in aliud si nulla facta sit in ea mutatione quae prist non erat […].”

37 **Godfrey of Fontaines**, *Quodl.-VI*, 7, p. 158: “Aliquot si sic dici potest de voluntate, aequo faciliter et rationabiliter poterit negari omnis potentia activa distincta a passivo, et dictur quod unumqueque ens producit se ipsum de potentia ad actum […] Quis etiam probabit lignum vel corpus aliquod caliﬁeri ab igne?”
Or, to quote Bartholomew of Bruges (writing in Paris between 1307 and 1309):

[M]atter would acquire form in the [mere] presence of some extrinsic thing and a woman would impregnate herself when a man is present and the wood would transform itself into man-made forms like beds and stools when the workman is present.  

If we admit *sine qua non* causality, in other words, then it will be a *slippery slope* into a view about causality which makes no sense at all, at least not to Godfrey.  

Godfrey, then, thinks it is better to claim that when X becomes φ this is not ever owing to the fact that X made itself φ in the presence of something else which although it looks to be an agent in fact is not, but it is rather *always* because there is some other item which is really an agent—something that acts upon as efficient cause whatever changes. Hence, either we abandon some (to Godfrey’s mind) fairly robust metaphysical assumptions about the nature of causation or we abandon (or provide alternative explanations for) whatever intuitions we might have (in the case at hand) about the will’s self-agency. Better to do the latter than the former in Godfrey’s view, and that, so it would seem, is exactly what he did.  

3. Durand’s Defence of Anti-affectionism  

Durand thinks that it is better to revise our metaphysics than to give in to the idea that the object is an efficient cause of our cognitive acts. In this section, I want to evaluate the success of Durand’s metaphysical revision. I will first lay out Durand’s proposal, and then I will address Godfrey’s Achilles argument in light of this proposal.  

3.1. Durand’s Analysis of Sine Qua Non Causality  

So, what is a *sine qua non* cause? Well, it is something that reduces an *accidental potency* to
act. What is an accidental potency? As a first approximation, it is the sort of potency that a natural agent is in when it is not engaged in its natural operation, in what it does. For instance, it is the sort of potency that a campfire is in when there is no hot dog around for it to heat. It is also, Durand will claim, the sort of potency that Socrates is in when there are no visible items around for him to see or intelligible items around for him to think about. Just as a present hot dog is a *sine qua non* and not an efficient cause of the campfire’s transition, as it were, from potency (being able to cook) to act (cooking), so too a present hot dog is a *sine qua non* cause and not an efficient cause of Socrates’ transition from potency (being able to see) to act (seeing). There are, in short, two kinds of potency and so too there are two kinds of causes, that is, two sorts of answers that we can give to the question: What reduces a thing in potency from potency to act?

But we get ahead of ourselves. Let’s start from the start: Aristotle. Durand’s proposal is explicitly based upon a particular interpretation of a distinction that the Stagirite raises a number of times in a number of places—the passage Durand focuses on is *Physics*, VIII, 4.

There Aristotle writes:

> But the fact that the term ‘potency’ is used in more than one way is the reason why it is not evident whence such motions as the upward motion of fire and the downward motion of earth are derived… Thus what is cold is potentially hot: then a change takes place and it is fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and hinders it. So, too, with heavy and light: light is generated from heavy, for example air from water (for water is first such in potency), and air is actually light, and will at once realize its proper activity unless something prevents it. The activity of lightness consists in the thing being in a certain place, namely high up: when it is in the contrary place, it is being prevented… As we have said, a thing may be in potency light or heavy in more ways than one. Thus not only when a thing is water is it in a sense light in potency, but when it has become air it may be still light in potency; for it may be that through some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position, whereas, if what hinders it is removed, it realizes its activity and continues to rise higher.

According to most medieval philosophers, following Aristotle’s great Arabic commentator, Averroes, Aristotle is drawing a distinction here between *essential* and *accidental* potency.

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41 Durand paraphrases this passage, as filtered through Averroes (see nt. 43 below), in Durand, *Super Sent. (A)*, II, 3, 5, pp. 159-160.


So, what is this a distinction between? One example Aristotle gives is the hot and the cold. A cold item is able to become hot, and so it is in one sort of potency—call it essential—with respect to becoming hot. Once a heat-making agent is present to this cold item, it will transition from something able to be hot to something actually hot; it will have undergone an essential reduction: its essential potency will become actual. However, once it is actually hot, it might still be in potency in another sense—call this accidental potency. It is now something able to make other things hot but (provided there is nothing around for it to heat up) it is not something actually making other things hot. Hence, present to it a heatable item and it will transition from such accidental potency to act; it will have undergone an accidental reduction: its accidental potency will have become actual.

The distinction between essential and accidental potency is an important one for Durand. After paraphrasing Aristotle’s text, Durand writes:

What is in mere accidental potency is not in potency to a new form nor does it need, in order to be reduced into act, an agent giving to it a new form.44

On Durand’s view, there are two kinds of potency (essential and accidental) and so too two kinds of reductions (essential and accidental) which in turn demand two kinds of analyses. If A is in essential potency with respect to B, then (1) B is something absolute superadded to A (“a new form”) and (2) A’s reduction requires an agent or efficient cause, C (“an agent giving a new form”). By contrast, if A is in accidental potency with respect to B, then (1) B is not something absolute superadded to A and (2) A’s reduction does not require an efficient cause.


44 Durand, Super Sent. (A), II, 3, 5, p. 160 (translated text in italics): “Illud quod est solum in potentia accidentalis non est in potentia ad novam formam nec indiget ad hoc ut reductur in actum agentis dantem novam formam; sed habens actum primum solum est in potentia accidentalis ad actum secundum, qui est operatio; ergo etc.” (On the notion of ‘first’ and ‘second act’ see below.) See also Quaest. disp., I, ed. J. Koch, Münster 1929, p. 41: “Illud quod est in potentia accidentalis tantum non est in potentia ad aliquam formam facientem compositionem realem […] Maior patet, quia illud quod est in potentia accidentalis, ad hoc quod fiat actu, non indiget transmutatione; sed quod est in potentia ad formam indiget transmutatione, quia forma non potest induci in subiecto nec educi de subiecto nisi per actionem agentis transmutantis.” See also Peter of Palud, Super Sent., II, 3, 4, 3; Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 1073, f. 18va (Z) and Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B II 22, fol. 25ra (B): “Prima ratio sumitur ex diversitate potentiae accidentalis ad essentiem, quae ponitur octavo Physicorum, potest enim potentia accidentalis reduci ad actum [primum add. Z] sine violientia, nulla [ulla Z] nova forma sibi impressa, sicut grave remoto prohibente fertur deorsum nulla forma absoluta de novo sibi impressa, quia est in potentia accidentalis, non essentiem, quia iam habet essentiam quam natus est consequii talis actus. Potentia autem accidentalis reducitur in actum a causa per accidens. Sed potentia essentiens non reductur in actum sine causa per se formam imprimente, nisi forte per violentiam, sicut grave sursum non fertur nisi au levitate sibumpressa et gravitate expulsu.”
A’s essential reduction will make reference to an efficient cause (indeed, an efficient cause distinct from A), our analysis of A’s accidental reduction will not; instead it will make reference to, on the one hand, the fact that A has some form or nature which enables it to do something and, on the other hand, something else, which, although a cause of some sort, is not an efficient cause, for, as Durand puts it a few lines earlier, if this ‘something else’ were an efficient cause, then A “would not have been in accidental potency but rather it would have been in essential potency.”

This is all still very abstract. Let’s return to Aristotle’s example. Suppose that A is cold. Hence, A is in essential potency (with respect to becoming hot or having heat). If we introduce a heat-making agent, then A will undergo an essential reduction and become hot: it will have received the form of heat from that heat-making agent as efficient cause. Now, once hot, and provided nothing is around for A to heat up, A will be in accidental potency (with respect to making some other item hot). If we introduce a heatable item—a hot dog, say—A will undergo an accidental reduction and elicit its heat-making action (and so make the hot dog hot). Hence, the hot dog is a cause of some sort of A’s transition from potency to act, yet A did not receive a form from the hot dog as efficient cause, for A was not in essential potency but rather mere accidental potency with respect to making the hot dog hot. Hence, the hot dog is not an efficient cause but, well, a mere sine qua non cause.

Medieval authors also associated Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of potency with a distinction between two kinds of acts (or actuality), namely, first act (actus primus) and second act (actus secundus). On Durand’s view, an essential reduction—the reduction of an item existing in essential potency from potency to act—results in first act (at least) and provided it is able to execute a second act and nothing is preventing it second act as well. Yet sometimes an item, having been reduced from essential potency to first act, is impeded such that it cannot execute its second act. It will then be said to be in first act but not second act, or, in other words, it will then be said to be in accidental potency. Once more, when the cold item becomes hot (and so reduced from essential potency to act owing to some efficient cause and the reception of a form) it might be impeded from making some other item hot (owing to the absence of a heatable item, say). Hence, it will be in first act with respect to heating but not second act, or, alternatively, it will be in accidental potency. So too the heavy item that rests upon a plank and anything that has a nature upon which certain activities, operations or motions naturally follow which is in the wrong circumstances so that its operation is impeded. Remove these impediments and an accidental reduction occurs and so the item transitions from its first act into its second act even though it received no new form from an extrinsic efficient cause.

45 Durand, Super Sent. (A), II, 3, 5, pp. 159-60 (translated text in italics): “Auctoritas etiam Aristotelis octavo Physicorum est ad hoc, dicit enim ibi expresse quod generans dans formam dat etiam operationem et motum conveniendum formae, sicut dans calorem igni dat eam calefaciat combustibile praesens et dans ei levitatem dat ei per se motum sursum; habens enim formam solum est in potentia accidentalis ad operationem et motum conveniendum formae; et ideo ad hoc, ut reductur in actum, non indiget agente dante novam formam, quia iam non esset in potentia accidentalis solum, sed essenti.”

With this as background, let’s now turn to Durand’s answer to the question: What is the cause of a cognitive act? A few passages after his discussion of Aristotle’s *Physics*, Durand writes:

(A) Sometimes first and second act perfect a thing without reference to something else… In these cases, a thing is made to be under first and second act all at once from the same item… However, sometimes first and second act perfect a thing not without reference to something else but in relation (in habitudine) to something else and, thus, are signified as, e.g., able-to-make-hot (*calefactivum*) or able-to-break (*disgregativum*) and makes-hot (*calefacere*) or breaks (*disgregare*). Here first act implies a potential relationship (*respectus*) whereas second act implies an actual one. In these cases, something is not always at once under first act and second, but it might happen sometimes that it has first act without second act.

(B) The reason for this is because such first acts only require the potential presence of that with respect to which they are said whereas such operations or second acts require its actual presence. For instance, in order for something to be able-to-make-hot it is sufficient that it can have a heatable item present to it; but in order for it to make-hot it requires an actually present heatable item. And since it sometimes happens that something is potentially present which is not actually present, it will sometimes be the case that something is under first act without second act.

(C) Numbered among such acts are the intellect (or the intellective principle) and thinking (*intelligere*), for both of these are spoken of not without any reference whatsoever to something else but in relation to an intelligible item, and the intellect implies this relationship as potential whereas the act of thinking implies it as actual. Hence, something that has an intellect does not always think since it does not always have an intelligible item actually present to it… The object’s presence or the presentation of the object is the *sine qua non* cause since an act of thinking is not a perfection that makes no reference to something else but rather it is a perfection in relation to something else… And the same is the case with sensitive cognition.

47 Strictly speaking, Durand wishes to show how it is that the object is a *sine qua non* cause, but in doing so he tells us he will also provide an answer the questions: How thoughts and sensory perceptions come about in us? And why do we not always think or engage in sensory perception granted that we always have senses and intellects? DURAND, *Super Sent.* (A), II, 3, 5, p. 160: “Secundum patet, scilicet quod sint ab obiecto sicut a causa sine qua non, et in hoc apparebit tertium principale, scilicet qualiter intelligere et sentire fiat in nobis et quare non semper intelligimus aut sentimus, cum semper habeamus sensum et intellectum.” The first question, of course, is the question Aristotle had raised in *De an.*, III, 4, 429a10-12; the second question seems to be an attempt at avoiding the omniviscosity objection (see above nt. 34).

48 DURAND, *Super Sent.* (A), II, 3, 5, pp. 160-61: “[A] Actus primus et secundus quandoque perficiunt rem secundum se et absolute et sic significantur, ut calor et calere, albedo et albescere. Et in talibus simul et inseparabiliter res ab eodem efficitur sub primo actu et secundo, simul enim et ab eodem aliquid est calidum et calet, album et albescit. Quandoque autem actus primus et secundus perficiunt rem non absolute, sed in habitudine ad alterum et sic significantur, ut calefactivum et disgregativum, calefacere et disgregare. Et respectum talum importat actus primus secundum potentiam, actus autem secundus secundum actum. Et in talibus non semper simul est aliquid sub actu primo et secundo, sed contingit quandoque habere actum primum sine secundo. [B] Cuius ratio est quia actus primus requirit praesentiam eius ad quod dictur solum secundum potentiam, sed operatio vel actus secundus requirit praesentiam eius secundum actum, ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit calefactivum sufficit quod possit habere calefactibile, sed ad calefacere requiritur actualiter praesens calefactibile. Et quia contingit aliquid esse praesens secundum potentiam quod tamen non est actu praesens, ideo contingit aliquid esse sub actu primo absque actu secundo. [C] De numero autem talium actuum sunt intellectus vel principium intellectivum et intelligere, dicitur enim utrumque non omnino absolute, sed in habitudine ad intelligibile, quam habitudinem importat intellectus secundum potentiam, intelligere autem secundum actum. Propret quod habens intellectum non semper intelligit quia non semper habet intelligibile actu praesens […] Obiectum autem praesentatum vel praesentans obiectum est causa sine qua non pro eo quod intelligere non est perfectio mere absoluta, sed in comparatione ad alterum […] Et idem
Durand suggests in (B) that we should view both dispositions and the manifestation of those dispositions as non-absolute or relational properties, for the terms that we use to talk about such items ‘imply’ something else.\(^{49}\) For instance, when one says that something is calefactive (that is, it has the disposition to make something hot) one implies that it bears a relationship of some sort to something else, namely, to potentially present heatable items; so too with the manifestation of that disposition: when one says that something is engaged in the activity of making something hot (that is, is calefacting), one implies that it bears a relationship of some sort to something else, namely, to an actually present heatable item. Whereas calefaction (the operation of making something hot) implies the relationship of actual presence to a heatable item, calefactivity (the disposition to make something hot) implies the potential presence of at least one heatable item. In other words, dispositions and their manifestations are not monadic properties but rather polyadic properties.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{49}\) In characterizing Durand’s view, the anonymous author of “Utrum actus intelligendi aliquid reale absolutum addat super potentiam intellectivam” writes that operations like thinking and calefaction ‘connote’ a relation (respectus) to something else. See Paris, BnF, lat. 14572, fol. 159va: “[…] actus enim primus, ut dicunt isti [sc. Durandus], semper perficit rem in se et absolute, ut calor perficit [FOR: habet(?)] ignem et intellectus hominem et gravitas terram vel lapidem. Actus autem secundus dicit quandoque eamdem perfectionem connotando respectum ad alterum, ut calefacere, intelligere, sursum moveri et sursum esse; quandoque vero dicit talem perfectionem nullum talem respectum connotando, ut patet de lucere respectu lucis.”

\(^{50}\) In at least two texts Durand makes it explicit that he has the stronger (ontological) claim in mind, rather than the weaker (linguistic) claim. See Quaest. disp., I, ed. J. KOCH, Münster 1929, pp. 38-39 (emphasis mine): “Omnis forma absoluta quae est fundamentum relationis potest intelligi sine relatione; sed intelligere est huismodii, quia est fundamentum relationis referentis ad obiectum, ut ponetab Respondens; ergo poterit intelligi sine relatione ad obiectum. Ergo possim intelligere ipsum intelligere absque hoc quod cognoscam obiectum, quod falsum est. Ergo intelligere est relatio sola, et sic non facit realem compositionem cum intellectu, nec est res absoluta superaddita intellectui. Maior patet, quia possim creaturam intelligi sine rectio ad deum.” See also an additio to A contained in Peter of Aluode, Super Sent., II, 3, 4, 4, Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vit. lat. 1073, f. 4vb (edited by J. KOCH in the first edition [1929] of his critical edition of Durand’s quaestio 5, pp. 20-21, emphasis mine): “Quarta ratio sumitur ex habitudinem istorum actuam ad sua obiecta, quia si intelligere sit aliquid absolutum faciens compositionem cum intellectu, tunc intelligere et intelligibilem erunt relativa secundum dici tantum et nullo modo secundum esse, quia relativum secundum esse est illud cuius esse est referri et essentia est relatio, quod non convenit aliiuiu absoluto. Ex hoc sic arguitur: Relativa secundum dici non claudunt se mutuo in intellectu suo. Sicut si Sortes sit filius Platonis: in intellectu quidem patris clauditor filius et e contrario, sed in intellectu Sortis non includitur Plato nec e contrario, quia pater et filius sunt correlativa secundum esse, eo quod paternitas et filiatione sunt essentialiter relationes, Sortes vero et Plato sunt relativa solum secundum dici. Intelligere autem et sentire necessario includunt intelligibilem et sensibile. Ergo intelligere et sentire non sunt relativa secundum dici, nec per consequens sunt aliquid absolutum additum super sensum et intellectum faciens cum eis compositionem.”

This is not to say that such properties are relations that fall into the Aristotelian category of Relation. Although Durand does not, to my knowledge, discuss Aristotle’s categories in q. 5, elsewhere he argues that at least one sort of disposition (habitus) is a quality, even though it is not an absolute thing. See Super Sent. (A/B), III, 23, 1, a. 3, Paris, BnF, lat. 12330, f. 128rb (square brackets indicate additions): “Nec propter hoc debet videri aliquid quod habitus non sit qualitas eo quod proprue non est res sed modus rei, quia non solum relatio et sex ultima praedicamenta dicunt modos rerum sed etiam in Qualitate et Quantitate inveniuntur aliqua quae non dicunt propriue res sed modos reales, sicut numerus in Quantitate, non enim proprue est res aliqua praeter res numeratas sed est modus realis circa eas. [Similiter figura quae ponitur in quarta specie Qualitatis potius est modus] terminations quantitati quam aliqua res secundum se. Et idem est de habitu et dispositione quae sunt in prima specie Qualitatis, non enim sunt nisi quaedam prornitas et quidam modus se habendi bene et male in se vel ad alterum […] Praedicamenta enim non distinguuntur secundum rem et modum neque secundum rem sed secundum formam praedecendi. Et ideo omne illud secundum quod subjectum disponitur aliquiditer ad se vel ad alterum, sive sit res proprue sive sit modus rei, dictit qualitas, quia facit subjectum sium aliqua quale. Et similiter omne [illud] quod denominat subjectum [suum] aliquantum vel aliquotum dicitur quantitas – esto quod quandoque non sit proprue et secundum se res, sicut dictum est de numero.” Peter of Palude cites the above verbatim in Super Sent., III, 23, 1, Paris 1517, f. 116vb (1a opinio,
An example might help. Consider the warm soapstone. Now this soapstone has heat, an absolute or monadic property, for it can be said to have heat regardless of whatever else exists in the world. However, in a world in which there is no heatable item at all, the warm soapstone cannot be said to have the disposition associated with calefactivity—the ability to make items hot—for there just isn’t anything heatable that is even potentially present to it. But in a world in which there is at least one heatable item the soapstone will be said to have this disposition. Now, if we transport the soapstone back and forth between these two worlds, it will acquire and lose this disposition even though none of its monadic properties varied. So too in the case of an operation—that is, the manifestation of its disposition. None of the monadic properties of the soapstone change when the circumstances change such that a heatable item which before existed far away now comes to be present to the soapstone, thus occurring its act of heat-making.

Thought and sensory perception will, of course, turn out to be analysable along the same lines—which is what Durand tells us in (C). On Durand’s view, cognitive acts are the natural operations of things that have senses and intellects (monadic properties like heat). Hence, once a thing has an intellect or a visive power, and provided something intelligible or visible

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exists in the world, it will have a disposition founded upon that cognitive power, and so it will be in one of two states: either it will be in accidental potency if it is prevented or it will be engaged in cognitive operation if it is not. What prevents it, of course, is the absence of an intelligible or visible object, and so when the object is present to it, it will then be said to see or think. And so it is that the object—or, more precisely, its presence—is the cause sine qua non of a cognitive act.

3.2. Durand’s Answer to Godfrey’s Achilles Argument

I think the foregoing discussion should now put us in a position to examine how Durand would respond to Godfrey’s objections to the notion of a sine qua non cause. Recall that Henry of Ghent’s characterisation of the object of the will as mere sine qua non cause strikes Godfrey at least as both ad hoc and mysterious. It is mysterious because Henry claims it is a cause, yet it does not classify as any of the four kinds of causes Aristotle lays out. It is ad hoc because it only applies to the will.

Now, in order to answer the mystery objection all one must do is provide an adequate positive account of the notion. After all, why should the Stagirite have a stranglehold on the kinds of causes that are? Durand explains sine qua non causality in terms of the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental potency. On Durand’s view, the cause of an accidental reduction cannot be reduced (in our sense of the term) to one of the four kinds of causes, for, were it an efficient cause, then it would have caused an essential reduction and not an accidental reduction. Whenever a natural operation or motion is impeded, whatever removes that impediment should be treated as a sine qua non cause of the natural operation or motion. Who could ask for a better explanation than that?

Nor is an appeal to a sine qua non cause ad hoc, for on Durand’s view a sine qua non cause is not involved in a few exceptional cases, such as volition or mental acts, but it is involved in any accidental reduction: the fire’s transition from inactivity (not burning something) to activity (burning something) and a rock’s downwards motion are both owing to the removal of an impediment as a sine qua non cause. When the campfire elicits its cooking act, the presence of the hot dog is the sine qua non cause; when a rock falls down, the removal of the plank is a sine qua non cause; so too when Socrates sees Felix, the presence of Felix is the sine qua non cause. Of course, Durand’s position is still a kind of disjunctivism, for either a given reduction is an essential reduction or it is an accidental reduction. But unlike Henry’s disjunctivism, Durand seems to have a well-grounded criterion by which we can choose one or the other of the disjuncts.

4. Conclusion

Let’s sum up. We’d all like to think that the object of cognition somehow causes our cognitive acts. But what is the nature of this causal relation? Godfrey holds the conservative view that the object is an efficient cause whereas Durand takes the liberal position that the object is a special kind of cause: a sine qua non cause. But, as with all novelties, the burden is seemingly on Durand. What is a sine qua non cause?

He provides us with a number of reasons to be suspicious of the standard theory (§ 1). But
Godfrey provides us with a very consistent theory of causation that renders the notion of a *sine qua non* cause pretty dubious (§ 2). An efficient cause is something that reduces a potency to act and since nothing can reduce itself from potency to act and since we are in potency (with respect to seeing, hearing, and so forth) it stands to reason that it is the object that, as efficient cause, reduces us from potency to act. Durand’s response (§ 3) is to draw our attention to a distinction between two kinds of potency: accidental and essential. On his view, there is no efficient cause that reduces a natural agent in accidental potency to its act; rather what does this is the removal of an impediment, that is, a *sine qua non* cause. This is true with all natural agents, in a broad sense: rocks move down of their own accord owing to the removal of an impediment, campfires cook hot dogs, and Socrates sees Felix when Felix is present to him. A *sine qua non* cause reduces an accidental potency to act whereas an efficient cause reduces an essential potency to act. And we ought to hold that things with intellects or functioning eyes are in accidental and not essential potency.

So when Felix leaps upon my lap, Felix efficiently causes any number of effects in my body and, in a sense, he also causes my vision. However, he did not cause my vision *in the same sense of 'cause'* as he did these other effects, for he efficiently caused my lap to become warm but he did not efficiently cause me to *feel* that warmth. Rather, his presence alone caused that as a mere *sine qua non* cause.52

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