

Chapter 21

Durand of St.-Pourçain and Cognitive Habits

(*Sent. A/B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2*)

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Abstract Durand of Saint-Pourçain’s earliest treatment of cognitive habits is contained in his *Sentences* commentary, book 3, distinction 23. In the first two questions, he discusses the ontological status of habits and their causal role, establishing his own unique view alongside the views of Godfrey of Fontaines and Hervaeus Natalis. What follows is the Latin text and an English translation of Durand’s *Sentences A/B III, d. 23, qq. 1–2*.

Keywords Godfrey of Fontaines • Durand of Saint-Pourçain • Hervaeus Natalis • Cognitive habits

The two questions dealt with here are whether we need habits and in what ways habits influence our acts.¹ In the first, Durand tells us that an acquired natural habit is not a thing in the strict sense but it is rather a mode of a thing (*modus rei*) even though it does fall into the category Quality. This novel view about the ontology of habits received condemnation from his order,² and it provoked a number of replies

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²*Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae*, edited in J. Koch 1973, 103–104, nn. 158–159: “(n. 158) 3 D. 23 q. 1 qua quaerit utrum indigeamus habitibus, in tertio articulo positionis dicit quod habitus acquisitus animae intellectualis vel moralis vel corporis, sicut sanitas, non est proprie aliqua natura absoluta sed magis est modus rei vel naturae; unde secundum eum sanitas est sola commensuratio humorum, ita quod, sicut equus docetur ambulare per consuetudinem, ex qua nihil rei absolutum acquiritur sed solus modus consuetudinalis, sic habitus et dispositio, quae sunt in prima specie qualitatis, non sunt nisi quaedam pronitas et quidam modi se habendi. Contra opinionem communem. (n. 159) Ibidem dicit quod non solum relatio et sex praedicamenta ultima dicunt modos rerum, immo in quantitate et qualitate inveniuntur aliqua quae non dicunt proprie res sed modos reales, sicut numerus in quantitate non est aliqua natura proprie praeter res numeratas, sed est modus realis circa eas;

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from later thinkers,³ including William of Ockham in *Rep.* III, q. 7 (OTH VI, 202).¹⁸ When Durand returns to the topic later in *Sent.* C III, d. 23, qq. 1–4 (Venice 1571, ff. 252ra–254rb), he omits this discussion of the ontological status of the habit,¹⁹ and in his *Tractatus de habitibus* (= *TDH*) q. 5 (“Utrum habitus acquisitus sit res absoluta vel modus rei”), the two manuscript witnesses break off after presenting nine opening arguments.⁴²⁰²¹²²²³

In the second question, Durand pits Hervaeus Natalis⁵ against Godfrey of Fontaines⁶ before presenting his own position.⁷ According to Hervaeus, there is no real distinction between the act and its modifications because of the habit (e.g. as easier or better), and so the habit and the power both contribute to the causation of a modified act as two partial causes, jointly sufficient. According to Godfrey, or at

similiter figura, quae ponitur in quarta specie qualitatis, potius est modus terminans quantitatem quam aliqua res secundum se. Contra opinionem communem.”

³ See among others: Durandellus (aka Durandus de Aureliaco), *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella (on the authorship, see W. Duba 2014); Bernardus Lombardi, *Sent.* III, Lect. 12 (in *ERFURT Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek* CA 2 368); Thomas de Strasbourg (aka Thomas de Argentina), *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564; Iohannes Capreolus, *Def.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues; and Prosper de Reggio Emilia, *Sent.*, Prol., pars 1, q. 5 (in *VATICAN lat.* 1086). As well, in *VATICAN lat.* 1086 there are several smaller texts that in some way reference this position: Texts 182, 199, 414, 456, 458. In *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, after his presentation of Durand’s position verbatim (ff. 116rb–117ra), Peter of Palude presents two further *opinioniones*, each of which tackles Durand’s position in some detail (opinio 4a at ff. 117yb–118rb and opinio 5a, presumably Palude’s, at ff. 118rb–119ra). John Capreolus reports Durand’s position and the arguments for it as *argumenta quorundam*, telling us that he is relying on John Duns Scotus (*quorum dicta recitat Scotus*). However, in Scotus, outside of his brief remarks in *Quodl.* 13 and *Ord.* I, d. 17 about habits as relational entities, I have not found him discussing Durand’s precise arguments here, although in *Ord.* I, d. 17, q. 3 we find a cryptic remark (ed. Wadding-Vivès, 60, n. 8): “De hac autem quaestione Utrum scilicet habitus sit aliquod absolutum dicitur alias.” In the Vatican edition (*Ord.* I, d. 17, pars 1, qq. 1–2, ed. Vatican, 174, n. 73) this remark is moved out of the main text and treated as a *textus interpolatus*, with the following remark by the editors at footnote 3: “Non constat utrum hic textus ... referendus sit ad n. 72 [sc. where the Wadding-Vivès edition has it] vel ad n. 15 [sc. the first argument *contra* in *ibid.*, ed. Vatican, 144 = *Ord.* I, d. 17, q. 2, ed. Wadding-Vivès, 42, n. 3].”

⁴ *TDH* q. 5 is contained in *VATICAN lat.* 1076 ff. 9rb–va and *VATICAN lat.* 1086 ff. 192vb–193ra.

⁵ Durand seems to have been drawing on either *Quodl.* I, q. 13 (ed. Yamazaki [= Paris 1513, ff. 28ra–29rb]) or *Quodl.* IX, q. 4 (Paris 1513, the first principal doubt from f. 161ra through f. 162ra), which are largely the same. We are fairly certain that Hervaeus’s *Quodl.* I dates to Easter 1308 or Christmas 1307, during his first regency in Paris (see R. Friedman 2007, 433–438). We are less certain about Hervaeus’s *Quodl.* IX (Paris 1513, ff. 160va–162rb). However, the current view is that it should be dated before *Quodl.* I, while Arnold of Liège was regent master, 1303–1307 (see Friedman, 2007, 440–445). Hervaeus maintains the same position in *Quodl.* III, q. 7, a. 2, Paris 1513, ff. 78ra–b, although his remarks there are brief, and he refers the reader back to *Quodl.* I. I rule out *Quodl.* III, q. 7 as a source on the grounds (among others) that it does not contain the “disjunctive” argument Durand references at n. 9 below, which is present (twice) in *Quodl.* I, q. 13 and IX, q. 4.

⁶ The position attributed to Godfrey is closer in content and wording to the Godfridian position that Hervaeus presents in *Quodl.* I, q. 13 and IX, q. 4. In Godfrey, see *Quodl.* XI, q. 4, PhB V and XIV, q. 3, PhB V.

⁷ John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol also pit a view like Hervaeus’s against a view like Godfrey’s in their discussions. See Iohannes Duns Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 17, pars 2, qq. 1–2, ed. Vatican (*via tertia* resembles Hervaeus’s position; *via secunda* resembles Godfrey’s position) and Petrus Aureolus, *Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, Rome 1596 (Godfrey: f. 418b–419a et f. 421b; Hervaeus: ff. 421b–422b).

least according to the Godfridian position found in our text, there is a real distinction between the modification and the act, and the habit is the cause of the modification and the power the cause of the act. In *Sent. C* III, d. 23 and in *TDH* this discussion is omitted.

Durand's own view is more nuanced. He first (op. 3, art. 1) draws a distinction between kinds of modifications (intensity, moral determination, and ease), and then (art. 2) looks into each one. The intensity of the act is not really distinct from the act *pace* Godfrey. However, *pace* Hervaeus, the habit is not a *per se* cause of the intense act; rather it is a mere *per accidens* cause insofar as it removes an impediment towards an act's being more intense.⁸ Moral determination—in the sense that an act is in conformity with right reason or in discord with right reason—and ease are not modifications of the act (be they really distinct from the act or not) but rather modifications of the power or agent performing the act, and so once more a habit is not to be understood as a *per se* cause of an easily elicited act or a morally correct act; rather it removes the impediment to the power's easily performing an act, or performing an act that is in conformity with right reason. In *Sent. C* III, d. 23 and *TDH* his discussion of these three modifications is more detailed, although his position remains mostly the same.⁹

For some discussion of these texts, see Joseph Koch 1927, 129–143 and P. Hartman (forthcoming). I have used six manuscripts (see below), marking all variants except inversions,¹⁰ checked against a verbatim presentation of Durand's position in Peter of Palude's commentary on Book III, d. 23, qq. 1–2 (Paris 1517): q. 1 is at ff. 116rb–117ra (opening arguments and main body of the text) and f. 119ra–b (replies to the opening arguments); q. 2 is at ff. 119rb–120va (including opening

⁸ Durand received censure from his order on this point as well. *Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deviat a doctrina venerabilis doctoris nostri fratris Thomae*, edited in J. Koch 1973, 104, n. 160: "(n. 160) Eadem d. q. 2 utrum habitus faciat ad substantiam actus vel ad modum tantum, reprobando duos modos dicendi contrarios dicit quod habitus per actus <acquisitus> tamquam removens prohibens facit ad intensionem actus in quantum habitus virtuosus faciens appetitum sensitivum oboedientem rationi impedit carnem ne retrahat intellectum ab objecto rectae rationis; ex quo sequitur quod ferebatur intensius quam prius quando ferebatur ex solo tractu sensus ad oppositum; et similiter habitus vitiosus per quem appetitus intellectivus concordat sensitivo removet illud quo prohibebatur ferri intense, scilicet contra tractum appetitus sensitivi. Aliter non videt quod sit causa per se intensionis nisi forte quia ratione habitus obiectum magis apparet conveniens potentiae; in obiectum autem ostensum sub ratione convenientioris potest potentia ferri intensius. Contra opinionem communem quae ponit habitum virtuosum et vitiosum in eodem subiecto, quia contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Secundum autem istam opinionem omnes habitus virtuosus essent in solo appetitu sensitivo ne contra voluntatem traheretur et e converso omnes vitiosus in intellectivo ne contraheretur sensum vel ne causaret intensionem illo modo. Item quantum ad secundum non esset dare habitus speculativos qui aliquid facerent ad intensionem actus quia nec faciunt obiectum apparere sub ratione boni vel convenientis."

⁹ In *Sent. C* III, d. 23, he dedicates a question to each mode: intensity (q. 2); determination (q. 3); and ease (q. 4). In *TDH* q. 2, he dedicates an article to each: intensity (a. 1); determination (a. 2); ease (a. 3).

¹⁰ This edition is a preliminary edition in two senses: I have not completed a stemma and I have not had access to the following manuscripts containing Book III: MUNICH *Staatsbibliothek* Clm 26309, ff. 164ra–205vb (see F. Retucci 2012, 28*–29*); VENICE *Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana* Cod. Marc. Lat. Z.104 (=2004), ff. 1ra–73va (see T. Jeschke 2012, 28*–29*).

arguments and replies to them). In two instances, I have included text from Palude's presentation of Durand's position not included in the manuscripts as *additiones*.

Koch maintains that these two *additiones* indicate that Palude had access to the so-called first (A) redaction whereas the manuscripts he had studied of Book III, d. 23, q. 1 contained the so-called second (B) redaction (1927, 42–43). This remains the going thesis until further research on the manuscripts of Book III is finished.¹¹

A = AUXERRE *Bibliothèque municipale* Ms. 26, ff. 107vb–109ra¹²

B = PARIS *Bibliothèque Nationale de France*, Ms. lat. 12330, ff. 128ra–129va¹³

C = MELK *Stiftsbibliothek*, Codex Mellicensis 234 (637, L 65), ff. 89va–93vb¹⁴

D = NAPLES *Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III"* Ms. XIII A 17, ff. 34vb–36vb¹⁵

E = NAPLES *Biblioteca Nazionale "Vittorio Emanuele III"* Ms. VII C 22, ff. 39vb–41va¹⁶

F = SAINT-OMER *Bibliothèque municipale* Ms. 559, ff. 1r–12r¹⁷

P = Petrus de Palude, *Sent.* III, d. 23, qq. 1–2, Paris 1517, ff. 116rb–117ra, 119ra–b, 119rb–120va.

<...> supplevi

[...] delenda

Quaestio 1: Utrum indigeamus habitibus

1. CUM VERO SUPRA HABITUM SIT ETC. *Distinctio* 23a. Circa distinctionem istam quaeritur de tribus: primo de habitibus in generali; secundo de fide in speciali; tertio de formatione et informitate fidei. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primum est Utrum indigeamus habitibus.

2. ET VIDETUR QUOD NON quia actus praecedentes habitum sunt in omnibus similes actibus sequentibus ipsum (C 89vb) nisi quoad facilitatem; sed propter hanc non indigemus habitibus; ergo nullo modo. Maior patet ex secundo *Ethicorum* ubi expresse dicitur quod actus praecedentes habitum et generantes ipsum similes sunt actibus qui post habitum generatum eliciuntur, nisi quod signum generati habitus est sentire in opere delectationem quae fit propter facilitatem et connaturalitatem actus.

¹¹ See F. Retucci 2014, 72, fn. 7 and T. Jeschke 2009. See as well M. Perrone and F. Retucci 2017, 15*–58*, where the editors working with Book I show that the majority of the manuscripts we have for Book I contain the so-called B redaction and not the A redaction.

¹² This manuscript is described in F. Retucci 2012, 26*–27*. Book III: ff. 89ra–129ra.

¹³ This manuscript is described in F. Retucci 2012, 30*–31*. Book III: ff. 102ra–149vb.

¹⁴ This manuscript is described in T. Jeschke 2012, 24*–25*. Book III: ff. 9ra–146ra.

¹⁵ This manuscript is described in T. Jeschke 2012, 25*–26*. Book III: ff. 1ra–60vb.

¹⁶ This manuscript is described in J. Koch 1927, 52–53. Book III: ff. 4ra–65va.

¹⁷ The manuscript is described in J. Koch 1927, 54–55. It contains Book III, dd. 23 to the end.

9–11 actus praecedentes ... generalitatem actus] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.3 1104b5–6 (*Ar. lat.* 26.3 398).

2 sit] est C || *Distinctio*] istam *add.* F 2–3 distinctionem istam] quam F 3 in speciali] specialiter B 4 et] vel B || *informitate*] *informatione* F 7 ipsum] *om.* BF || *sed propter*] secundum autem E 8 non] *ideo(!)* E || *indigemus*] in (se dicitur quod actus praecedentes habitum *add. sed exp.*) digemus E || *secundo*] *eh add. sed ras.* D 9 dicitur] dicit B 10 habitum generatum] generationem habitus B || *nisi quod*] ubi B 11 sentire] *in marg.* *fientem add.* D *fientem* EF || *delectationem*] *dilectionem* F || *connaturalitatem*] *generalitatem* AC

Minor declaratur, quia difficultas actus facit ad meritum, facilitas autem minuit. Ergo si habitus facit solum facilitatem in actum, plus nocet quam profit. Si autem dicatur, sicut et consuetum est dici, quod difficultas ex parte operis auget meritum, et hanc non tollit habitus, difficultas vero ex parte operantis non auget sed minuit, et hanc habitus tollit—CONTRA: secundum sententiam domini (F 1v) Mar. XII et Luc. XXI vidua quae posuit duo minuta in gazophilatio plus meruit quam divites qui magna dederunt quia difficilium fuit sibi illud modicum ponere quam divitibus multum. Constat autem quod haec difficultas (E 40ra) non fuit ex genere operis sed (D 35ra) ex conditione operantis, quia pauper erat. Ergo talis difficultas auget meritum.

3. Item potentiae rationales perfectiores sunt naturalibus; sed potentiae naturales non indigent habitibus, nec propter actum nec propter facilitatem seu modum; ergo nec rationales.

4. IN CONTRARIUM EST, quia habitus est quo quis bene vel male disponitur ad se vel ad alterum, ut dicitur quinto *Metaphysicae*; sed eo quo bene disponimur indigemus; ergo saltem bonis habitibus indigemus.

5. RESPONSIO. Circa quaestionem istam videnda sunt tria. Primum est: Cum “habitus” multipliciter dicatur in quo sensu nunc accipiatur “habitus”? Secundum est: Propter quid ponendi sunt habitus? Tertium est: Quid sit habitus Utrum proprie sit res (C 90ra) vel modus rei?

art. 1: In quo sensu nunc accipiatur “habitus”?¹⁸

6. QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sciendum est quod “habitus” dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo est postpraedicamentum; alio modo praedicamentum; tertio modo est determinata species Qualitatis. Quod patet sic. (F 2r) “Habitus” enim ab habendo dicitur;

¹⁸ Art. 1 is verbatim (with minor variation) in *Sent. C* III, d. 23, q. 1, Venice 1571, ff. 252ra–b, nn. 7–8 and *TDH* q. 1, ed. Takada, 12–14 (with two larger omissions from the latter noted below).

25–26 habitus ... alterum] ARISTOTELES, *Met.* V.20 1022b10–11. 33 tripliciter] *TDH* q. 1, ed. Takada, 12, omits the first sense and so has “dupliciter” rather than “tripliciter”. 33–35 Uno modo ... sic] *om.* *TDH* q. 1, ed. Takada, 12. 35–39 habitus ... ad aliam] THOMAS DE AQUINO, *ST* I-II, q. 49, a. 1, ed. Leonine: “... habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.”

12 declaratur] probatur F || actus] *om.* B || meritum] *sup. l.* meritum(?) *add. sed ras.* F || autem] *om.* DE 13 facilitatem] et connaturalitatem *add.* DE || actum] actu ACF || profit] proficit B 14 sicut] sic E 15 auget] meritum *add.* F 16 domini] magni *add.* F 16–17 Mar. XII et Luc. XXI] *om.* BF 17 vidua] pauper *add.* B || posuit] ponit DE || duo] aera *add.* F || plus] a *add. sed exp.* D 18 magna] magis F || fuit] *sup. l.* secundum *add. sed ras.* F 19 fuit] ex parte (*sed ras.*) haec non sint *add.* D || genere] parte DE vel genere *add. sub. l.* D 22 potentiae] *in marg.* D *om.* E 23–24 ergo nec rationales] *om.* F 24 nec] ut *ante corr.* D ut E 26 ad] a F || vel] *sup. l.* F || alterum] eorum(?) *add. sed exp.* D || disponimur] disponuntur *ante corr.* D disponuntur E 28 Cum] *sup. l.* quod *add. sed ras.* D quod E 29 dicatur] habitus *add.* B || accipiatur] homo *add. sed ras.* D homo *add.* E || habitus] *om.* B 30 Propter] ad *add. sup. l.* C || quid] quod (*secundum sed exp.*) E || est] *om.* F || Quid sit habitus] *om.* A || Utrum] habitus *add.* A 31 vel] tantum *add.* DEF || rei] *om.* BF 33 sciendum est] dicendum B || est] *om.* A || tripliciter] d *praem. sed exp.* C et *add.* B || Uno] primo A 34 est] *om.* A || postpraedicamentum] praedicamentum A || praedicamentum] postpraedicamentum A 35 species] *in marg.* D

ab eo autem quod est habere nomen “habitus” dupliciter derivatur. Uno modo secundum quod homo vel quaecumque alia creatura dicitur rem aliquam habere. Alio modo secundum quod aliqua res aliquid se habet (puta bene vel male) secundum seipsam vel in respectu ad aliam.

40 7. “Habitus” vero primo modo dictus est postpraedicamentum, quia se extendit ad res diversorum praedicamentorum, dicitur enim homo habere manum (quod pertinet ad praedicamentum Substantiae), quantitatem vel albedinem (quod pertinet ad alia duo praedicamenta), et dominus dicitur habere servum (quod pertinet ad praedicamentum Relationis), et homo vestem vel anulum (quod pertinet ad Habitus—qui est
45 speciale praedicamentum, ut statim infra dicitur). Omnes enim modi quibus una res dicitur aliam habere reducuntur ad tres, quia quod habetur vel habetur per modum accidentis inhaerentis, et istud se extendit ad res plurium praedicamentorum, vel per modum correlativi, et istud potest reduci ad praedicamentum Relationis, vel per modum ornatus, et istud cum non reducatur ad aliud praedicamentum facit speciale
50 praedicamentum per se quod vocatur Habitus ut cum dicitur homo armatus vel vestitus vel aliquid huiusmodi.

8. “Habitus” autem secundo modo acceptus—scilicet prout aliqua res dicitur se habere bene vel male ad se vel ad alteram—est species Qualitatis, quae dicitur habitus vel dispositio. (F 2v) Differt autem “habitus” sic dictus ab aliis duobus
55 primis modis, quia “habitus” primo et secundo modo non dicitur (C 90rb) ipsa res quae habetur sed solum habitudo habentis ad illud quod habetur; sed in tertio modo “habitus” primo et principaliter dicitur illa (B 128rb) res quae habetur secundum quod habens (A 108ra) dicitur aliquid se habere—puta bene vel male.

9. Et sic definit PHILOSOPHUS habitum quinto *Metaphysicae*—quod habitus
60 est dispositio secundum quam disponitur aliquid bene vel male secundum se vel secundum aliud. Et secundo *Ethicorum* dicitur quod potentia est qua possumus,

44–45 homo ... dicitur] *om.* TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 12. 58 puta bene vel male] *om.* TDH q. 1, ed. Takada, 13–14, and adds: “Et sic patet primum. Quantum ad secundum sciendum quod cum idem importetur per nomen et definitio, quia definitio est ratio quam significat nomen, ut dicitur quarto *Metaphysicae*, ideo ad sciendum substantiae quantitatem vel albedinem *add.* DE *sed ras.* D 44 aliud] ARISTOTELES, *Met.* V.20 1022b10–11. 61–62 potentia ... possumus] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II,5 1105b24–28.

36 est] *om.* F 37 alia] *in marg.* D *om.* E || dicitur rem] *in marg.* D *om.* E || aliquam] aliam CDE 39 vel] *om.* F 40 vero] *om.* A ergo BF 42 albedinem] qualitatem B quod pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae quantitatem vel albedinem *add.* DE *sed ras.* D 44 anulum] habere *add.* C || ad] praedicamentum *add.* B || Habitus] habitus B || qui] quod F 45 modi] *in marg.* m *ante corr.* C 46 dicitur] se habere ad *add.* C || habere] *om.* C || quia] illud *add.* B || per modum] per modum *add.* DE *sed ras.* D 47 istud] illud F 48 istud] illud F 49 istud] illud F 50 vocatur] dicitur B *prae add.* *sed exp.* C || homo] *sup. l.* D *om.* CE 50–51 armatus ... huiusmodi] vestitus armatus vel huiusmodi A vestitus armatus vel habitus C 50 vel] *om.* E 51 vestitus] *sup. l.* D || vel aliquid] et DE || aliquid] *om.* F 52 scilicet] *om.* B *sed sed exp.* D 53 se] ipsam *add.* A 56 sed] secundum quam F 56–57 in tertio ... habitus] habitus dictus tertio modo A 58 quod] quam ABF || aliquid] de aliquo modo B 60 aliquid] quis A || secundum se] sed solum E || vel] *sup. l.* D *om.* E 61 secundum] *om.* F || est] *om.* A || possumus] est *add.* F

habitus quo bene vel male possumus.¹⁹ Et in hoc sensu loquimur de habitu nunc quaerendo Utrum indigeamus habitibus.

65 **10. [Additio P, f. 116va]** Secundum tamen COMMENTATOREM quinto *Meta-*
physicae respectus seu habitudo quae facit praedicamentum Habitus est habitudo
 <consistens in> hoc quod est habere aliquid, sicut “contentum habet continens,
 sicut animal habet cutem et arbores habent cortices, et hoc est praedicamentum
 Habitus. Cyphum autem habere aquam et civitatem habere homines e converso,
 scilicet secundum quod continens habet contentum, et secundum hunc modum locus
 70 habet locatum, et hoc est praedicamentum Ubi. Et universaliter respectus in hoc
 praedicamento est conversus illi quae est in praedicamento Habitus.”

11. Et sic patet primum.

art. 2: Propter quid ponendi sunt habitus?

75 **12. QUANTUM AD SECUNDUM** dicendum quod habitus requiritur propter inde-
 terminationem rei quae ad alteram disponitur. Cuius ratio est, quia, sicut patet ex
 dictis, habitus est quo quis disponitur bene vel male. Ubi ergo ex natura rei non
 est aliqua indifferentia ad bene vel male, sed est unus determinatus modus, ibi non
 est necessarius habitus. Et e contrario, ubi est ex natura rei indifferentia ad bene
 vel male, ibi neccessarius est habitus ad ponendum determinatum modum. Nunc est

¹⁹ At this point *TDH* q. 1 and *Sent. C* III, d. 23, q. 1 close off the body of the question with the following (*TDH* q. 1, ed. Takada, 14–15 and *Sent. C* III, d. 23, q. 1, Venice 1571, f. 252rb, nn. 8–9): “Alio modo definitur sive (seu *TDH* q. 1) describitur a Commentatore tertio De anima quod habitus est quo quis potest uti cum voluerit. Et idem vult beatus Augustinus libro De bono coniugali dicens quod habitus est quo aliquid (aliquis *TDH* q. 1) agitur cum opus est. <n. 9> Hiis suppositis dicendum est ad quaestionem quod in nobis sunt aliqui habitus et indigemus aliquibus eorum, scilicet bonis, et oppositi sunt possibles. Quod patet dupliciter secundum duas descriptiones datas de habitibus. Ex prima sic. Potentia quae est indifferens ad actum bonum et (vel *TDH* q. 1) malum indiget aliquo determinante ipsam ad actum bonum; sed in nobis sunt plures potentiae quae de se sunt indifferentes ad actum bonum vel malum, sicut intellectus de se est indifferens ad intelligere <p. 15> verum vel falsum quorum unum est bonum intellectus, scilicet verum, aliud malum, scilicet falsum; et (*om. Sent. C*) voluntas etiam necnon et (*om. Sent. C*) appetitus sensitivus indifferenter se habent ad appetere bonum vel malum; ergo tales potentiae indigent aliquo determinante ipsas ad actum bonum. Hoc autem facit habitus bonus. Ergo bonis habitibus indigemus. Et per consequens probatur quod habitus mali sunt possibles quia opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem nisi alterum insit a natura; sed habitus boni non insunt nobis a natura; ergo mali possunt inesse. Ex secunda patet idem sic. Omnis potentia quae in actu suo potest pati difficultatem indiget aliquo facilitante ipsam ad actum; sed plures potentiae sunt in nobis quae in actibus suis possunt pati difficultatem, ut dicit Philosophus septimo Ethicorum de continente qui cum difficultate prosequitur bonum rationis imminente passione; ergo tales potentiae indigent aliquo facilitante ipsas ad actum. Hoc autem facit habitus, ut patet ex secunda eius descriptione. Ergo etc.”

66–71 contentum ... Habitus] AVERROES, *Comm. Met.* V.23, Iuntina VIII, 135vaH-I.

62 habitus] vero *add.* B || loquimur] loquitur CF **63** indigeamus] indigemus B || habitibus] *om.* B **66** consistens in] consequens P **74** secundum] secundum *add. sed exp.* E || dicendum] sciendum est F est *add.* C **74–75** propter indeterminationem] *om.* B **77** aliqua] *om.* B || indifferentia] differentia(!) A **78** habitus] ad ponendum modum *add.* A **78–79** Et ... determinatum] *hom.* A **79** determinatum] declaratum B

80 ita quod potentiae rationales in nobis non sunt ex natura rei determinatae ad unum
modum (F 3r) secundum bene vel male, sed habent multam indifferentiam. Potest
enim intellectus intelligere vere et false et voluntas appetere bene et male. Propter
quod in potentiis rationalibus, sive sint rationales per essentiam sive per participa-
tionem, indigemus habitibus ad determinandum per habitum hanc indifferentiam.
85 Determinat autem habitus inquantum inclinat potentiam ad determinatum modum,
ad bene si sit bonus, ad male si sit malus. Et hoc est quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS
secundo *Ethicorum* ponendo differentiam inter habitum et potentiam, ubi dicit quod
secundum habitus dicimur boni vel mali, secundum potentias vero non.

13. [Additio P, f. 116vb]²⁰ Ex quo satis potest consequenter deduci, ut dicunt,
90 quod in intellectu respectu principiorum non est forte necessarium ponere habitum,
quia intellectus est determinatus respectu illorum, cum quasi naturaliter veniant
ad mentem (quarto *Metaphysicae*) et sint sicut locus ianuae respectu <forum>
in domo: “in foribus autem quis delinquet?” (secundo *Metaphysicae*). Quasi dicat:
nullus! Et hoc maxime intelligendum est de primis principiis simpliciter in terminis
95 entis quantum ad speculabilia; de agibilibus etiam forte non minus, quia semper
ad optima deprecatur ratio. Unde continentis et incontinentis rationem laudamus
(in fine primi *Ethicorum*). Ex hoc etiam forte deducitur consequenter secundo:
quod in potentia voluntatis non est ponendus habitus, quia non propter passiones
secundum quas male <se> habere possit cum nulla passio sit in voluntate;
100 nec propter indeterminationem quia potentialitas rationalis quia illa tollitur per
intellectum ex praesentatione obiecti—obiecti autem est determinare potentiam.
Et si obiiciatur quod appetitus rationalis vel <imaginatio> determinat intellectum
secundum PHILOSOPHUM nono *Metaphysicae* ergo non determinatur ab obiecto,
dicendum quod differenter intellectus determinat voluntatem et voluntas intellec-
105 tum, quia intellectus determinat voluntatem specificando actum, sed voluntas quoad
exercitium actus.

²⁰ Vide Koch 1927, 43: “Wir haben aber auch ein zweites Zeugnis dafür, daß die obigen Ausführungen wirklich im Text des Durandus gestanden haben. Bernardus Lombardi zitiert in III Sent. Lect. 12 die ersten Worte und verweist für den Rest auf Durandus selbst. ‘Patet ergo ex hiis dictis, quare in potenciis naturalibus non ponuntur habitus, in racionalibus vero ponuntur, sic quod in virtutem cadant respectu aliquorum actuum, sed non respectu omnium, quod dico pro tanto, quia intellectus respectu primorum principiorum saltem non habent istam indifferentiam; et ideo amplius esset dicendum, sed sufficit. Vide Durandum.’”

88 secundum habitus ... vero non] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.5 1106a8–12. **90** in intellectu ... habitum] Cf. *TDH* q. 4, a. 8, ed. Koch. **92** quarto *Metaphysicae*] ARISTOTELES, *Met.* IV.3 *passim*. **93** in foribus autem quis delinquet?] ARISTOTELES, *Met.* II.1 993b5 (*Ar. lat.* 25.3.1 [M] 43). **97** in fine primi *Ethicorum*] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* I.13 1102b15. **97–106** Ex hoc ... actus] Cf. *TDH* q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch. **98** in potentia ... habitus] Cf. *TDH* q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch. **103** nono *Metaphysicae*] ARISTOTELES, *Met.* IX.5 1048a10–15 (*Ar. lat.* 25.3.1 [M] 184).

80 sunt] *om.* F || ex natura rei] *om.* A **81** vel] et F **82** et voluntas appetere] *in marg.* D a propositione E a propositione *add. sed exp.* D || et] vel B *sup. l.* vel *add. sed ras.* D || male] semper *add.* DE *sed ras.* D **83–84** per participationem] *in marg.* D propter comparisonem E propter comparisonem *add. sed ras.* D **84** indigemus] ab *add.* D ad *add.* E **84–85** ad determinandum ... habitus] *hom.* B **84** per] *sup. l.* F || hanc] *in marg.* haec *add. sed ras.* D ad *add.* E **85** autem] eam *add.* D omnes *add.* E **88** habitus] habitum B **92** forum] foris P **99** se] sic P **102** imaginatio] imaginationis P

14. Et sic patet secundum.

art. 3: Quid sit habitus?

110 15. QUANTUM AD TERTIUM dicendum est quod habitus, (D 35rb) saltem acquisitus ut excludamus (C 90va) habitum supernaturalem et infusum, non est proprie aliqua natura absoluta sed est magis modus rei vel naturae. Quod patet sic.

16. [1] Quia sicut se habet res ad rem, sic modus ad modum; sed habitus non requiritur nisi propter modum; ergo non est proprie res sed modus.

115 17. [2] Secundo patet idem comparando habitum corporis ad habitum animae, quia sanitas, quae est habitus corporis, non videtur secundum se esse (E 40rb) aliqua natura absoluta, sed sola commensuratio vel proportio seu determinata habitudo humorum inter se; ergo similiter videtur de habitibus animae.

120 18. [3] Tertio (F 3v) idem patet specialiter de habitibus animae sic, quia ut dicitur nono *Metaphysicae* per actum intra manentem nihil alterum constituitur; sed habitus causantur per actus intra manentes, et per frequentiam actuum; ergo non est proprie res aliqua, sed modus ex tali frequentia derelictus.

125 19. [4] Quarto, quia illud quod acquiritur per frequentationem actuum et ammittitur per solam cessationem eorum non videtur esse res secundum se sed potius quidam modus consuetudinis; sed omnis habitus acquisitus est huiusmodi; quare etc. Minor de se patet, experimur enim quod per cessationem longam actuum amittimus habitus morales et speculativos. Maior probatur, quia quod est aliqua res secundum se numquam desinit nisi corrumpatur vel corruptione subiecti vel actione

112–113 Quia ... modus] Cf. GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Rep.* III, q. 7, OTh VI, 202; DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904; PETRUS DE PALUDE, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 117vb–118ra et op. 5, f. 118rb–vb; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Def.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292a–b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 114–117 Secundo ... animae] Cf. GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Rep.* III, q. 7, OTh VI, 202; DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904; PETRUS DE PALUDE, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118ra et op. 5, f. 118vb–119ra; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 115–117 sanitas ... inter se] Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Phys.* VII.3 246b4–6. 118–121 Tertio ... derelictus] Cf. DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904; PETRUS DE PALUDE, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118ra et op. 5, f. 119ra; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Def.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. 119 nono *Metaphysicae*] ARISTOTELES, *Met.* IX.8 1050a34–35. 122–131 Quarto ... consuetudinales] Cf. DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 904–905; PETRUS DE PALUDE, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118ra–b et op. 5, f. 119ra; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Def.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb.

110 et infusum] *in marg.* D om. E || infusum] et *add.* A 111 patet] quod probatur primo *add.* F || sic] om. CDE 112 Quia sicut] *in marg.* D quod sic E quod sic *add.* sed quod *ras.* D || Quia] om. F || sic] ita ACF se habet *add.* B sicut E 114 ad habitum] *repl.* B 115 videtur] est B dicitur A || esse] om. AB || aliqua] res vel *add.* A 116 sola] solum B 117 humorum] humanorum B humanorum *ante corr.* C || videtur] esse *add.* A 118 Tertio ... animae] *hom.* B || sic] om. A || quia ut] quod B || dicitur] om. F 119 alterum] actu A 120 causantur] causatur DE || et] vel ABF || ergo] habitus *add.* F 122–123 actuum ... cessationem] *in marg.* D om. CE 123 eorum] eorum *sed in marg.* aliquorum C || esse] aliqua *add.* B || sed] om. E 124 consuetudinis] consuetudinalis DE 125 longam] longuam AB 126–127 habitus ... corrumpatur vel] *hom.* B 127 desinit] esse *add.* AF || nisi] nec D || vel] vel *sed nisi in marg.* D || corruptione] habitum absque *praem.* B || subiecti] om. B

contrarii vel cessatione causae efficientis. Actus autem quorum cessatione amittitur habitus absque corruptione vel actione contrarii non sunt causa conservativa habitus, alioquin habitus non manerent in dormientibus in quibus actus cessant. Quare habitus non sunt proprie res secundum se sed quidam modi consuetudinales.

20. Debemus imaginari quod sicut equus docetur ambulare in quantum ex consuetudine sic am(F 4r)bulandi efficitur pronus ad consimiliter ambulandum, nec ex hoc efficitur in eo aliqua res absoluta sed solum talis modus (C 90vb) consuetudinalis et talis pronitas, sic ex consuetudine actuum bonorum vel malorum fit in nobis quaedam pronitas ad consimiliter agendum eo quod consuetudo inclinat quasi per modum naturae.

21. Nec propter hoc debet videri ALICUI quod habitus non sit qualitas eo quod proprie non est res sed modus rei, quia non solum Relatio et sex ultima praedicamenta dicunt modos rerum immo in Qualitate et Quantitate inveniuntur aliqua quae non dicunt proprie res sed modos reales, sicut numerus in Quantitate, non enim proprie est res aliqua praeter res numeratas sed est modus realis circa eas. Similiter figura quae ponitur in quarta specie Qualitatis potius est modus terminationis quantitatis quam aliqua res secundum se. Et idem est de habitu et dispositione quae sunt in prima specie Qualitatis, non enim sunt nisi quaedam pronitas et quidam modus se habendi bene vel male in se vel ad alterum. Et hoc expresse videtur dicere PHILOSOPHUS septimo *Physicorum* ubi probat quod alteratio non est ad qualitates primae speciei, scilicet ad habitum et dispositionem. Dicit enim sic: “virtus omnis et malitia ad aliquid sunt. Sanitas quidem calidorum et frigidorum (F 4v) commensuratio quaedam est aut eorum quae infra sunt ad continens.” Idem intelligendum de habitibus animae. Unde concludit: “quoniam

132–137 Debemus ... naturae] Cf. DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 905; PETRUS DE PALUDE, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118rb; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Def.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292b; THOMAS DE STRASBOURG, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, Venice 1564, f. 36vb. **138–144** Nec ... secundum se] Cf. DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, q. 30, ed. Stella, 905. **146–153** Et hoc ... omnino] Cf. DURANDELLUS, *Evid.* III, d. 30, ed. Stella, 905; PETRUS DE PALUDE, *Sent.* III, d. 23, q. 1, op. 4, Paris 1517, f. 118rb; IOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *Def.* III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 292a. **149–151** virtus ... continens] ARISTOTELES, *Phys.* VII.3 246b4–6 (*Ar. lat.* 7.1 266). **151–153** quoniam ... omnino] ARISTOTELES, *Phys.* VII.3 246b4–6 (*Ar. lat.* 7.1 266).

128 vel cessatione causae efficientis] *om.* B || amittitur] amittuntur A **129** corruptione] subiecti *add.* A || non] *in marg.* D *om.*(!) E || conservativa] in conservando A conservantia F **130** manerent] remaneret DE || Quare] igitur A **131** sunt] est F || secundum se] *om.* A || sed] sunt *add.* DE || modi] modus F || consuetudinales] consuetudines DF **132** Debemus] autem *add.* B ergo *add.* F || sicut] *in marg.* ergo *add.* D quod sicut *add.* *sed exp.* E **133** sic] *om.* C || efficitur] fit B **134** solum] solus DE || consuetudinalis] consuetudinis F **135** consuetudine] talium *add.* B **136** inclinat] se *add.* *sed ras.* F || quasi] *om.* B **138** Nec] *sup. l.* rerum *add.* D rerum E **139** modus] *in marg.* modum(?) *add.* D **140** immo] sed etiam B **141** dicunt] dicuntur C || modos] modi *sed* modos *ante corr.* C || non] est *add.* *sed ras.* F **142** proprie est] dicitur A || aliqua praeter res] *hom.* A || numeratas] proprie *add.* A **143** Similiter ... modus] *om.* B **145** nisi] *om.* F **146** modus] modi A || vel] et B || in] ad A || vel] et B **147** quod] enim *add.* DE **148** est] ad primam *add.* B || qualitates] qualitatem B || ad] *om.* DE **149** sic] *om.* A || virtus] *om.* E || omnis] *om.* F || et] vel B || ad] in B **150** est] *om.* B || sunt] aut *add.* AB EF || ad] aliud D aliquid F **151** intelligendum] est intentum(?) F

igitur malitiae et virtutes sunt ad aliquid, <haec> autem neque <generationes sunt neque> ipsorum <generatio> neque alterationes omnino.” Praedicamenta enim non distinguuntur secundum rem et modum neque secundum rem sed secundum formam
 155 praedicandi. Et ideo omne illud secundum quod subiectum disponitur aliquid ad se vel ad alterum, sive sit res proprie sive modus rei, dicitur qualitas, quia facit subiectum suum aliquale. Et similiter omne illud quod denominat subiectum suum aliquantum vel aliquotum dicitur quantitas—esto quod quandoque non sit proprie et secundum se res, sicut dictum est de numero.

160 Ad argumenta principalia

22. Ad primum argumentum dicendum (C 91ra) quod propter facilitatem et determinationem potentiae ad certum modum indigemus habitibus. Et cum dicitur quod facilitas minuit meritum, dicendum quod non est verum de facilitate quae est ex parte operantis et quam ponit habitus—immo auget supposita aequalitate
 165 operis, quia (B 128va) auget voluntarium. Sed facilitas operis minuit et difficultas auget ceteris paribus. Et quod opponitur de vidua quae plus meruit dando duo minuta quam divites qui magna dederunt—dicendum quod verum est quia sibi fuit difficilius dare illud modicum quam divitibus multum. Nec ista difficultas fuit ex conditione operantis sicut arguebatur (D 35va) sed potius ex conditione operis.
 170 Paupertas (F 5r) enim non dicit conditionem personae sed dicit tenuitatem fortunae. Comparando ergo illud quod vidua dedit ad illud quod sibi remansit plus dedit quam divites quibus proportionaliter plus remansit non accipiendo solum proportionem personae ad personam, sed rei datae ad remanentem.

23. Ad secundum dicendum quod potentiae naturales non indigent habitibus nec quoad substantiam actus nec quoad modum, quia ex natura sua feruntur in actus suos solum secundum unum (E 40va) modum. Sed potentiae rationales cum sint indet(A 108rb)erminatae ad diversos modos indigent habitibus determinantibus ipsas. Nec

161 Ad primum argumentum] *supra* n. 2. **174** Ad secundum] *supra* n. 3.

152 igitur] ergo ADF praeter(?) E || et virtutes] *in marg.* moventes(?) *add. sed ras.* D moventes E || sunt] *in add. sup. l.* D || ad] in B || haec] *om.* B horum ACDEF || autem] *om.* B aut F **152–153** generationes sunt neque] *om.* ABCDE **153** generatio] generationes ABCDEF || omnino] omnes E **154** modum] *om.* F || rem] rationem F **155** illud] *sup. l.* A || aliquid] *om.* C **156** sit] fuit *ante corr.* C || sive] sit *add.* BF **157** aliquale] esse quale F || illud] *om.* ABCF || suum] *om.* BCDEF **158** dicitur] qualitas *add. sed ras.* D || sit] fuit *ante corr.* C **162** habitibus] virtutibus A **165** voluntarium] *in marg.* notabilium(?) *add. sed ras.* D notabilium(?) E || minuit et] meritum quia F || difficultas] aug *add. sed exp.* C **166** quod] ideo cum BF || quae] dedit duo minuta quod *add.* B **166–167** dando duo minuta] *om.* B **167** magna] magis F || quia] quod B **168** difficilius] *om.* B || multum] magnum B **169** sed] *sup. l.* quod *add. sed exp.* E **170** enim] *om.* B || fortunae] formae CF **171** Comparando] operando F || dedit] comparatum *add.* F || illud] sibi *add. sed exp.* E || quod] *om.* B sibi *add. sed exp.* E || sibi] *sup. l.* F **171–172** plus ... remansit] *in marg.* A **174** potentiae] personae F **176** solum] *in marg.* D *om.* CE || potentiae] *om.* DE personae F || cum] ad E || sint] ad *add.* DE *sed ras.* D **177** diversos] actus vel *add.* A || indigent] indicant E || determinantibus ipsas] qui determinant eas B || Nec] ut *ante corr.* D ut E

propter hoc sunt minus perfectae quam naturales—immo perfectiores, quia haec indifferentia est radicaliter ex earum libertate et universalitate.

180 **Quaestio 2: Utrum habitus acquisitus faciat aliquid ad eliciendum sequentem actum quoad essentiam actus vel solum quoad modum**

1. Secundo quaeritur Utrum habitus acquisitus faciat aliquid ad eliciendum sequentem actum quoad essentiam actus vel solum quoad modum. ET VIDETUR QUOD sit causa eliciendi sequentem actum quoad essentiam actus, quia ex similibus actibus acquiritur habitus et acquisitus similes producit; sed habitus acquiritur
5 ex actibus quoad essentiam actuum (C 91rb) et non ratione modi, quia actus praecedentes habitum non sunt modificati; ergo videtur quod habitus acquisitus sit causa sequentium actuum quoad essentiam eorum.

2. Item actus primus est causa actus secundi quantum ad id quod est; sed scientia, quae est habitus intellectualis, se habet (F 4v) ad scire sicut actus primus
10 ad secundum; ergo est causa eius quantum ad id quod est. Et eadem ratio videtur esse de ceteris habitibus.

3. IN CONTRARIUM EST, quia secundum PHILOSOPHUM secundo *Ethicorum* potentia est qua possumus in actum, habitus vero quo bene vel male possumus; ergo
15 si per habitum simpliciter possumus in actum quoad essentiam actus, iam non erit habitus sed potentia, et sic peribit eorum differentia.

4. Item ad illud solum operatur habitus propter quod indigemus habitu; sed indigemus habitu solum propter modum; unde ubi modus est ex natura potentiae determinatus, non requiritur ibi aliquis habitus, ut ostensum est in praecedenti
20 quaestione; ergo habitus nihil facit ad actum nisi quia ponit modum.

5. RESPONSIO. Circa quaestionem istam est duplex modus dicendi.

Opinio prima (Hervaei)

6. Unus est quod tam potentia quam habitus realiter faciunt ad eliciendum actum quoad essentiam actus et quoad modum eius ita quod utrumque est a duobus simul
25 tamquam quolibet eorum existente imperfecto agente secundum se sed supplementibus vicem unius perfecti agentis. Tamen secundum rationem cuiusdam appropriationis potentiae attribuitur actus quoad essentiam, habitui vero quoad modum.

13 potentia ... possumus] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.5 1105b24–28.

178 immo] sed B 179 earum] eorum C || et] nobilitate seu *add.* B || universalitate] *sub. l.* B utilitate F 3 sit] sint DE || sequentem] *om.* BDEF || quoad essentiam actus] *repl.* C 4 acquiritur] acquiruntur DE causantur F || et] qui dum est F || similes] actus *add.* AF 5 quoad] quantum ad A || non] in(!) A 6 sunt] *sup. l.* C || acquisitus] *om.* DE 8 quantum ad] quoad A 9 est] *om.* B 10 quantum ad] quoad A 11 esse] *om.* A 12 est] arguitur F 13 actum] actu ACD || habitus] *repl.* A || ergo] igitur ABF autem E 14 erit] esset D 17 modum] solum *add. in marg.* D 18 ibi] ubi *add.* D 19 actum] actus B 22 quod] Prima opinio quae est Hervaei, Quodlibe<t> primum, quaestione <13a> *in marg.* P || habitus] habitudo F 23 utrumque] actus F 24 eorum] illorum C 25 unius] subiecti *add. sed exp.* E 26 attribuitur] *om.* F

7. Primum probatur sic. Quandocumque duo principia concurrunt simul ad unum simplicem actum ita quod neutrum secundum se est sufficiens talem actum elicere (F 6r) (aut non ita perfecte) oportet quod talis actus secundum totum quod in eo est fit ab utroque et non ab uno secundum unum et ab alio secundum aliud; sed ad eliciendum actum virtuosum sequentem habitum virtutis concurrunt potentia et habitus virtuosus ita quod alterum (C 91va) istorum non sufficit sine altero ad eliciendum talem actum (vel ita perfecte); ergo actus virtuosus secundum totum quod in eo est ab utroque simul quantum ad essentiam et modum, et non a potentia secundum unum et ab habitu secundum aliud. Maior patet ratione et exemplo. Ratio est, quia in simplici non est dare unum et aliud, et ideo omne simplex secundum totum quod in eo est ab uno tantum vel a duobus suppletibus vicem unius et non a duobus ita quod ab uno fit secundum unum et ab alio secundum aliud. Exemplum etiam est ad hoc, quia ad actum secandi requiritur in securi durities et acuties, nec sufficeret durities sine acuties, nec acuties sine duritie, et certe actus secandi totus est ab utroque simul et non ab uno secundum unum et ab alio secundum aliud. Et sic patet maior. Minor etiam manifesta est, quia actus virtuosus sequens habitum est actus unus simplex aequae sicut unus alius quicumque praecedens habitum, essentia enim actus (F 6v) et modus sunt in actu virtuoso duae res sed una tantum. Ad eliciendum etiam talem actum (vel ita perfecte) non sufficit potentia sine habitu nec habitus sine potentia, alioquin alterum superflueret. Quare etc. Sic igitur potentia et habitus concurrunt ad eliciendum actum perfectum ita quod totus secundum essentiam et modum est ab utroque simul quia supplet vicem unius perfecti agentis.

27 Primum probatur sic] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.* I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 11–13 (= Paris 1513, f. 28vb); IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 161vb; III, q. 7, Paris 1513, f. 78ra–b. 39–42 Exemplum ... secundum aliud] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.* I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 13 (= Paris 1513, f. 28vb): “Exemplum sensibile possumus habere de hoc, verbi gratia de duritie et figura, nam durities videtur quasi potentia quaedam secativa, figura vero est quasi habitus ad secundum sic vel aliter; verbi gratia, figura dolabrae, figura serrae, figura terebri disponunt durum ad secundum diversis modis et ad causandum diversas sectiones.”; IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 161vb: “Exemplum de praedictis possumus accipere in instrumentis artium mechanicarum ita quod accipiamus duritiem ferri pro potentia secativa, sed figuras ferrae securis et dolabrae et sic de aliis accipiamus quasi pro habitibus. Modo praedictae figurae praesupponunt duritiem et determinant ad secundum sic vel sic in quibus sectionibus sectio et modus secandi non sunt diversae res; sed durities requirit praedicta figuras ut per quas detrimetur ad sic vel sic secundum; sic etiam in potentiis indigentibus habitibus praeexigitur potentia et potentia requirit habitum determinantem et habitantem ipsam et sic patet quod potentia et habitus distinguuntur dato quod habitus una cum potentia possit in substantiam actus.”; III, q. 7, Paris 1513, f. 78rb.

27 sic] *om.* F || Quandocumque] quandoque AB || concurrunt] similiter *add. sed ras.* D
 28 secundum] *om.* F || talem] *om.* A || actum] illum *add.* A 29 aut] vel DE || totum] omne F 30 secundum] quod *add.* CDE || secundum] quod *add.* DE 31 habitum] actus B 32 altero] alio F 33 talem] *sup. l.* F || ita] *in marg.* ista *add. sed ras.* D || ergo] quo F || actus] habitus *ante corr.* C || virtuosus] *om.* F 34 est] *om.* F 35 ab] *om.* D 36 dare] nisi *add. in marg.* D || unum] aliud F || et aliud] *om.* E || et ideo] *om.* D 37 est] *om.* E 38 ita] fit F || secundum] per A || secundum] per A 39 quia] quod E 40 acuties sine duritie] e converso F 41 certe] autem *add.* D || totus] *om.* A || et] non *add. sed ras.* D 44 essentia] cum A || sunt] sint A 45 eliciendum] *in marg.* aliquod *add. sed ras.* D aliquod E || etiam] *sup. l.* F || talem] *om.* F || vel] *om.* F || perfecte] perfectum F 46 nec] vel BF 47 habitus] actus F 48 totus] actus *add.* DEF 49 vicem] *in marg.* in esse *add. sed ras.* D in esse E

50 **8.** Verumtamen secundum modum cuiusdam appropriationis potentiae attribuitur
 generatio actus quoad essentiam eius, habitui vero quoad modum. (D 35vb) Cuius
 ratio est duplex. [1] Una, quia quando duo principia concurrunt ad unum actum quo-
 rum unum supponit alterum, actus quoad essentiam appropriatur ei quod supponitur,
 55 quoad modum vero appropriatur ei quod supponit alterum, sicut in ipso actu modus
 supponit essentiam. (C 91vb) Cum ergo (B 128vb) habitus supponat potentiam
 et non e converso, ideo essentia actus attribuitur potentiae, modus vero habitui.
 [2] Alia ratio est, quia quando duo principia concurrunt ad unum (E 40vb) actum
 quorum unum est magis indeterminatum, aliud vero magis determinatum, essentia
 actus attribuitur per appropriationem principio magis indeterminato, modus vero
 60 principio magis determinato, nam in actu modus est quasi quaedam determinatio
 essentiae actus. Potentia autem est principium magis indeterminatum, habitus vero
 principium magis determinatum. Propter quod essentia actus attribuitur potentiae
 per appropriationem, (F 7r) modus vero habitui.

9. Secundum hanc positionem respondetur ad rationes in contrarium. Ad primam
 65 cum dicitur quod potentia est qua possumus, habitus vero quo bene vel male,
 DICUNT ISTI quod in actu simplici (sicut est actus virtuosus) totum (scilicet essentia
 actus et modus) est a potentia et totum ab habitu realiter, quamvis secundum
 appropriationem essentia attribuitur potentiae et modus habitui. Et cum subdicitur
 quod “iam habitus non esset habitus sed potentia”, DICUNT quod vere habitus est
 70 quaedam potentia. Unde PHILOSOPHUS tertio *De anima* et octavo *Physicorum* dicit
 quod habens scientiam per eam est in potentia accidentali ad scire, quia cum habitus
 sit potentia accidentaliter supponit aliam potentiam priorem quae verius et prius
 dicitur potentia scilicet essentialis. Et quod sic oporteat dicere probatur, quia modus
 actus ad quem facit habitus aut est idem quod essentia actus aut aliud. Si idem ergo
 75 quod est causa modi actus est causa essentiae eius. Si aliud adhuc sequitur quod
 habitus sit quaedam potentia, quia omne illud quod est principium eliciendi actum
 habet rationem potentiae, ut patet ex eius definitione. Si ergo modus sit aliud ab

50–51 Verumtamen ... modum] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.* I, q. 13, ed. Yamazaki, 13 (= Paris 1513, f. 29vb); IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, ff. 161vb–162ra; III, q. 7, Paris 1513, f. 78rb. **64** Ad primam] *supra* n. 3. **65** potentia ... male] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.5 1105b24–28. **70** tertio *De anima*] ARISTOTELES, *De an.* II.5 417a22–30. || octavo *Physicorum*] ARISTOTELES, *Phys.* VIII.4 255a25–b23.

50 cuiusdam] *om.* F **51** generatio] *om.* E determinatio F || eius] *om.* A || quoad] secundum *add.* B **52** Una] *om.* DE || quia] *om.* F || actum] *om.* F **53** appropriatur] appropriatus F **54** vero] autem A || alterum] *om.* A || sicut] *om.* CDE **55** Cum ... potentiam] *om.* F **56** ideo] quoad *add.* A ita F || vero] autem *add. in marg.* D non E **57** quando] *repl. sed ras.* D **59–60** modus ... determinato] *om.* F **60** actu] actum E || quasi] *om.* F **64** positionem] opinionem BF **65** quod] *om.* C || vero] *om.* B autem F **66** sicut] sic F || est] *om.* DE || actus] *in marg.* habitus *add. sed exp.* C habitus DE **67** secundum] *repl. sed ras.* F **68** cum] *om.* F **70** quaedam] *om.* CDE || Unde] quando DE **71** accidentali] accidentaliter B actuali F || quia] quaero F || habitus] cum *add.* AB cum *add. sed exp.* C **72** accidentalis] aptitudinalis AF || aliam] scientiam *add. sed exp.* D || et] per B || prius] proprius A per prius F **73** scilicet] naturalis ideo non dicitur potentia absolute sed habitus quia talis potentiae scilicet accidentaliter *add. in marg.* A || essentialis] accidentalis(!) ACDE **75** eius] actus DE **76** illud] *om.* F || est] habet A || principium] rationem A **77** aliud] *om.* F

essentia actus et habitus sit principium causativum talis modi, sequitur quod habitus sit quaedam potentia.

80 **10.** (C 92ra) Ad secundum DICUNT quod licet habitus requiratur solum propter modum, quia tamen essentia actus et modus coincidunt in idem realiter, necesse est (F 7v) quod illud quod est causa unius sit causa alterius quamvis secundum rationem causatio actus magis approprietur potentiae, causatio vero modi habitui.

Opinio secunda (Godefridi)

85 **11.** Alius modus dicendi est quod sola potentia est causa actus quantum ad essentiam eius, habitus autem solum quoad (A 180va) modum. Cuius ratio est triplex.

12. [1] Prima talis est. Omnis potentia potest in actum sibi proportionatum absque quocumque addito quod sit ratio eliciendi ipsum; sed potentia intellectiva habet intelligere quoad essentiam actus tamquam actum sibi proportionatum; similiter potentia appetitiva habet pro actu sibi proportionato appetere quoad essentiam talis actus; ergo potentia intellectiva potest in omne intelligere et appetitiva in omne appetere quoad essentiam talium actuum absque quocumque addito quod sit ratio eliciendi tales actus. Dico autem “absque alio addito quod sit ratio eliciendi” quia
95 potentia intellectiva vel appetitiva non potest exire in actum suum nisi remoto impedimento si quod sit et praesentato objecto. Sed haec non sunt ratio elicitive actus sed sola potentia.

13. [2] Secunda ratio talis est. Sicut se habet potentia supernaturalis ad habitum supernaturalem, sic potentia naturalis ad habitum naturalem, vocando “habitum naturalem” habitum ex naturalibus acquisitum de quo loquimur; sed potentia
100 supernaturalis sola est principium eliciendi actum supernaturalem quoad essentiam

80 Ad secundum] *supra* n. 4. **88–97** Omnis ... potentia] Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodl.* XIV, q. 3, PhB V, 342–3; XI, q. 4, PhB V, 23. **98–108** Sicut se ... conclusio] Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodl.* XI, q. 4, PhB V, 22–24.

78 et] *om.* DE || causativum] activum A **80** secundum] secundam C || dicunt] dicendum A || habitus] *om.* B || requiratur] requirantur *ante corr.* B referatur F **81** quia] quod E || actus] *in marg.* DE **82** illud] *sup. l.* idem *add. sed ras.* F || secundum rationem] *om.* A **83** causatio] causato B || modi] *in marg.* C **85** Alius modus dicendi est] Secunda opinio quae est <Godefridi> de Fontibus in Quoli<beto> *in marg.* P || dicendi] *om.* BCF || actus] virtuosus *add.* A **86** eius] *om.* A **88** potest] ponit F **90** quoad essentiam actus] *om.* F || tamquam actum sibi proportionatum] pro actu sibi proportionato F **90–91** similiter potentia] *om.* F **91** habet ... proportionato] *om.* F **92** potest] ponit F **93** actuum] accidentalium *ante corr.* D accidentalium E **93–94** absque ... actus] *hom.* BF **93** quocumque] alio *add.* DE **94** tales actus] *om.* A || Dico ... eliciendi] *in marg.* A || Dico] et *praem.* DE || autem] *sup. l.* tamen *add. sed exp.* E || sit] habet E || eliciendi] tales actus *add.* BF || quia] quo A **95** potest] possit A **96** si] scilicet D || et] in D || praesentato] privato B || haec] hoc ADF || sunt] est ADF || elicitive] eliciendi F **97** actus] *om.* BF || sola] *om.* F || potentia] ergo *add. sed ras.* ergo etc *add.* F **98** talis] *om.* B || est] *om.* F || habitum] poten *praem. sed exp.* C **99** sic] se habet *add.* BF || habitum] *om.* DE **100** habitum] *om.* F non *add. sed exp.* A || ex] de F || loquimur] loquitur BC **101** principium] ad *add.* F

actus, habitus vero supernaturalis solum facit ad modum actus; ergo similiter est de potentia naturali et habitu acquisito ex naturalibus. (F 8r) Maior patet per simile. Minor declaratur quia per solam potentiam supernaturalem, puta per potentiam
 105 consecrandi, fit actus consecrationis. Per caritatem autem, (C 92rb) quae est habitus supernaturalis, nihil fit circa praedictum actum quoad essentiam actus, sed solum apponitur modus, qui est meritorie consecrare. Quare patet minor. Sequitur ergo conclusio.

14. [3] Tertia talis est. PHILOSOPHUS secundo *Ethicorum* intendit ponere realem
 110 differentiam inter potentiam et habitum et non solum secundum rationem vel adaptationem; sed differentia quam ponit est quod potentia est per quam possumus in actum, habitus vero quo bene vel male possumus; ergo in hoc differunt (D 36ra) realiter habitus et potentia: quod potentia elicit solum actum, habitus vero solum modum, et non tantum per adaptationem, ut PRIMI DICUNT.

15. Pro hac opinione videtur multum esse textus ARISTOTELIS: quinto *Metaphysicae*
 115 et secundo *Ethicorum* in pluribus locis—si sola superficies litterae consideretur.

16. Ad argumenta quae sunt contra hanc opinionem respondetur quod primum
 argumentum ita est contra PRIMAM OPINIONEM sicut contra SECUNDAM, quia
 120 si nihil potest causare nisi aliquod simile ei a quo causatum est, sequitur quod habitus non potest causare promptitudinem, facilitatem vel modum in actu sequente, quia hoc non habuerunt actus praecedentes ex quibus causatus (F 8v) est habitus. Et tamen PRIMI DICUNT quod habitus causat talem modum licet non solum. Ergo argumentum ita est contra EOS sicut contra SECUNDOS. Dicendum ergo ad argumentum quod habitus non causatur ex praecedentibus actibus ratione essentiae
 125 ipsorum absolute loquendo sed propter frequentationem eorum per quam causatur in (E 41ra) appetitu quaedam dispositio per quam firmius et promptius exit in eosdem actus quantum prius, hoc enim facit circa omnem potentiam consuetudo et frequentatio actuum.

109–114 Tertio ... dicunt] Cf. GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, *Quodl.* XI, q. 4, PhB V, 24.
111 adaptationem] Cf. HERVAEUS NATALIS, *Quodl.* IX, q. 4, Paris 1513, f. 162ra: "Nam ad auctoritates Philosophi quibus videtur quod potentia causat actum et habitus modum, si essent mille potest ad omnes dici quod hoc intelligitur secundum praedictam adaptationem, non autem quin utrumque sit causa utriusque realiter loquendo, ipse enim Philosophus frequenter facit talem adaptationem in reducendo effectus ad causas." **111–112** potentia ... possumus] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.5 1105b24–28. **117–118** primum argumentum] *supra* n. 1.

102 actus] eius CDE || ad] quoad A || ergo] quo *ante corr.* D est *add. sup. l.* D quo E || similiter] actus *add. sed exp.* C de *add. sup. l.* D actus *add.* DE **103** ex] in *marg. et sup. l.* D et *ante corr.* CD et E || naturalibus] tali *post corr. sed* naturalibus *ante corr.* C **105** consecrationis] in *marg.* consecratus *add.* D consecratus E || autem] actus F || quae] qui CDEF **106** actus] eius CDE || solum] solus CDE **109** Tertia] tertio AC ratio *add.* BF || est] *om.* B || Philosophus] in *add.* C **111** adaptationem] aptationem BC actus *add. sed exp.* E || per quam] qua F **112** in actum] *om.* ABF **113** quod] sed ABF || vero] non(!) DE **114** tantum] solum BF *om.* A **115** multum] *om.* F || quinto] nono DE **116** in] et BF || litterae] latere *ante corr.* C latere E **117** contra] circa *add.* C || respondetur] primo *add.* F **118** opinionem] *om.* C **119** aliquod] aliud F **120** non] *om.*(!) B || promptitudinem] promptionem F vel *add.* ADF || actu sequente] actum sequentem A || sequente] *om.* F **121** hoc] *om.* A **122** talem] actum vel *add.* A **123** ita] in *marg.* D non E || Dicendum] est *add.* A *om.* D respondendum E **124** quod habitus] *om.* F || causatur] causantur A **126** per quam] *om.* F || firmius] citius BF **127** quantum] in quos BF quem E

17. Ad secundum potest dici quod in eo quod est scire sunt duo, scilicet (B
129ra) intelligere (quod pertinet ad essentiam actus) et sic intelligere, scilicet recte
et infallibiliter (quod pertinet ad modum actus). Habens ergo scientiam tamquam
actum primum ratione scientiae est in potentia ad scire (C 92va) qui est actus
secundus, non quoad essentiam eius sed quoad modum iam dictum, et illius modi
tamquam actus secundi causa est scientia tamquam actus primus.

135 **Opinio tertia (Durandi)**

18. Nunc inquirendum est quid veritatis habeat utraque opinio vel in quo deficiat.
Circa quod sic proceditur, quia primo ostendetur qui et quot sunt illi modi
qui reperiuntur circa actum elicito a potentia perfecta per habitum et secundo
deducetur in quolibet illorum modorum an habitus possit causare talem modum nihil
operando ad essentiam talis actus.

Opinio tertia, art. 1: Qui et quot sint illi modi

19. QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sciendum est quod triplex modus invenitur circa
actum elicito a potentia perfecta per habitum. Unus modus est intensio in actu,
actus enim sequens habitum (bonum vel malum) videtur esse intensior quam actus
praecedens et generans ipsum, cuius causa postea reddetur. Alius modus est quod
talis actus est praecise concors rectae rationi vel praecise discors a (F 9r) recta
ratione: primum est in actu elicito a potentia perfecta per habitum virtuosum;
secundum est in actu elicito a potentia disposita per habitum vitiosum; potentia
autem sine habitu indifferenter elicito nunc unum nunc alterum—et hic est modus
de quo loquitur PHILOSOPHUS secundo *Ethicorum* dicens quod potentia est qua
possumus, habitus autem quo bene vel male possumus. Tertius modus est quod actus
sequens habitum facilius elicito et delectabilius quam actus praecedens ipsum qui
elicito a nuda potentia, ut patet similiter ex secundo *Ethicorum*. Tantum de primo.

Opinio tertia, art. 2: An habitus possit causare talem modum

20. QUANTUM AD SECUNDUM dicendum est quod si loquimur de primo modo qui
consistit in intensione actus, sic habitus tantum facit ad essentiam actus quantum

129 Ad secundum] *supra* n. 2. 150–151 potentia ... possumus] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.5 1105b24–28.

130–131 ad essentiam ... pertinent] *hom. sed* ad essentiam actus et similiter intelligere recte et infallibiliter *add. in marg.* D *hom.* E 130 et sic] *ante corr. sed etiam post corr.* C || et] etiam et etiam *add.* F || scilicet] quod est F || recte] et faciliter *add.* B 132–133 scire ... quoad] *hom.* A 133 iam] *sup. l.* F 136 habeat] habere D || vel] ut A 137 quia primo] *ras.* F || ostendetur] *om.* F ponetur A || sunt] sint A 139 nihil] naturaliter DE 140 talis] *om.* CDE 142 est] *om.* A 138–143 et secundo ... habitum] *hom.* F 143 intensio] intentio *ante corr.* C || in actu] *om.* A 145 reddetur] *om.* A 146 praecise] praefixe BF praefige *ante corr.* C perfecte DE 146–147 recta ratione] rectitudine B rationis F 146 recta] causa(?) *ante corr.* D aliqua(?) E 148 in actu elicito] *om.* B || disposita] perfecta D || vitiosum] virtuosum F quia *add.* AF quod *add.* BDE quod *add. sed exp.* C 149 autem] *om.* AF || indifferenter] *om.* BF || alterum] indifferenter *add.* BF 150 potentia] *in marg.* C 151 autem] vero A est *add.* BF 152–153 actus ... elicito] *om.* DE 152 actus] actum B actum *ante corr.* C 153 ut] et hic A et BDE et *ante corr.* C || similiter] etiam F || ex] *om.* F || Tantum] Hoc tamen dictum sit A et hoc *praem.* D et *praem.* F 155 dicendum] sciendum A || est] *om.* F 156 tantum] *om.* A

facit ad talem modum et e converso. Quod patet breviter, quia intensio actus et cuiuslibet formae attenditur secundum ipsam essentiam actus vel formae et non secundum aliquid additum, (C 92vb) ut probatum fuit libro primo distinctione
 160 17a. Propter quod nihil potest attingere ad talem modum quod non attingit ad
 essentiam actus. Igitur quantum facit habitus ad hunc modum tantum facit ad
 essentiam actus. Facit autem habitus ad hunc modum qui est intensio actus tamquam
 165 removens prohibens, quia enim appetitus intellectivus et sensitivus feruntur in
 contraria, ideo uterque remittitur in suo actu per alterum, patitur enim quilibet
 appetitus difficultatem in actu suo ex tractu alterius in contrarium. (F 9v) Quia
 igitur habitus virtuosus facit appetitum sensitivum oboedientem rationi et non
 sicut prius trahentem in contrarium, ideo removet illud quod prohibebat appetitum
 intellectivum ferri intense in obiectum concors rationi rectae. Et similiter habitus
 vitiosus per quem appetitus intellectivus concordat appetitui sensitivo removet illud
 170 quod prohibebat ne ita intense feretur in suum obiectum. (A 108vb) Propter quod
 habitus tam virtuosus quam vitiosus est causa intensionis actus sicut removens
 prohibens. Qualiter autem sit causa per se? Non video—nisi forte quod ratione
 habitus obiectum magis apparet conveniens potentiae; in obiectum autem ostensum
 sub ratione melioris et convenientioris nata est potentia ferri intensius.
 175 **21.** (D 36rb) Si vero loquamur de secundo modo sic dicendum est quod talis
 modus non est modus actus sed potentiae, determinatur enim potentia per habitum
 ad talem actum, actus autem non determinatur ad aliquem modum. Cuius ratio est,
 quia determinans alterum formaliter est in determinabili quod est de se indifferens,

159–160 libro primo distinctione 17a] DURANDUS DE SANCTO PORCIANO, *Sent. B I*, d. 17, qq. 3–4, ed. M. Perrone and F. Retucci; *Sent. C I*, d. 17, qq. 5–10, Venice 1571. *Vide Solère 1997 and Solère 2011.* **165** ex tractu alterius in contrarium] *Cf. TDH* q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch.

157 talem] actum *add. sed exp.* E **158** formae] actum *add.* B **158–159** dicitur ... additum] *om.* A **158** attenditur] dicitur BF || ipsam] et *add.* B et *ante corr.* C **159** secundum] *sup. l.* CD *om.* BE || aliquid additum] aliud F || fuit] est F **160** 17a] *om.* F **161** actus] igitur aliquid *add.* F **161–162** facit ... actus] *hom.* CDEF **161** Igitur quantum] *om.* A || facit] autem *add.* A || tantum] creatum(!) B quantum *add.* A **162** actus] igitur aliquid *add.* A || autem] *om.* AF || qui est] sicut F || intensio] in intensione A || actus] *om.* B **163** removens] remans(?) B || quia] enim(?) intellectus *add. sed ras.* F || feruntur] fervunt *ante corr.* C **164** enim] in A **165** tractu] contractu ADE **166** igitur] appetitus *add. sed ras.* F || oboedientem] oboedire A **167** sicut prius trahentem in contrarium] *in marg.* C || sicut] posset *add. sed exp.* C || trahentem] contrahentem A || contrarium] contrario AB contrario *ante corr.* C || ideo] non(!) D **168** rectae] *in marg.* ratione *add.* D ratione E *om.* F || habitus] virtuosus *add. sed ras.* F **169** vitiosus per quem appetitus] *hom.* B || vitiosus] virtuosus A **170** prohibebat] prohibens A prohibet F || feretur] feratur F || quod] *om.* B **172** autem] aut *ante corr.* C **173** potentiae] ponitur E || autem] aut C **174** sub ratione melioris] alicuius rationis F || sub] *om.* CDE || est potentia ferri intensius] *om.* F || est] postea *add. sed exp.* D **175** loquamur] loquitur C || sic] sicut E **176** sed] licet DE || enim] autem F || per] talem *add.* F **177** actus ... aliquem] *repl.* B || ad] per A

180 alioquin non esset determinabile sed potius esset de natura sua determinatum.
 Potentia autem est de se indeterminata ut tendat in obiectum concors rationi vel
 discors a ratione. Nullus autem actus deliberatus est sic indifferens sed necessario
 est determinatus ad alterum, (F 10r) ut patuit in secundo libro. Ergo modus qui
 consistit in tali determinatione est modus potentiae (C 93ra) et in potentia quae
 185 determinatur ad talem actum et non est modus actus vel in actu. Et ita falsa est
 imaginatio illa qua creditur quod habitus ponat hunc modum in actu—quin potius
 habitus ponit hunc modum in potentia vel est ipse modus. Propter quod nulla est
 quaestio quaerere an illud quod facit ad talem modum faciat ad (E 41rb) essentiam
 actus, cum supponatur quod talis modus sit in actu vel aliquid ipsius actus—quod
 est falsum. Sed est solum in potentia tamquam inclinans et determinans eam ad
 190 talem actum. Et sic habitus facit ad actum per modum inclinantis et determinantis
 potentiam solum.

22. Si autem loquamur de tertio modo qui est pronitas et facilitas eliciendi actum,
 sic utraque opinio praecedens deficit quae aestimat quod iste modus sit ipsius
 actus vel in actu causatus ab habitu solo secundum SECUNDAM OPINIONEM vel
 195 ab habitu et potentia simul secundum PRIMAM. Hoc autem non est verum, talis
 enim modus qui est pronitas sive facilitas non est modus actus sive in actu sed
 est modus potentiae, licet in habi(B 129rb)tudine ad actum ita quod cum dicitur
 quod habitus est quo faciliter elicitur actus, haec facilitas non est modus actus sed
 agentis, quem ponit habitus formaliter in potentia. Quod patet dupliciter. [1] Primo
 200 quia facilitas potentiae in actum suum quae est per (F 10v) naturam in illis in quibus
 est appetitus sensitivus sine intellectivo (ut sunt bruta animalia) vel intellectivus
 sine sensitivo (ut sunt angeli) est in hominibus in quibus est uterque appetitus per
 habitum superadditum potentiae, licet non sit tanta. Sed prima facilitas est naturalis
 modus vel conditio potentiae et non actus. Ergo et in nobis. [2] Secundo quia actus
 205 omnino similis quoad obiectum et intensionem est facilis post habitum, difficilis
 ante habitum. Ergo facilitas et difficultas non est conditio actus, qui de se (C 93rb)
 est uniformis, sed est agentis. Et confirmatur per simile in corporalibus, quia ferre
 aliquod pondus est difficile debili et facile forti, quae difficultas ut de se patet est

182 secundo libro] Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *Sent. C* II, d. 40, q. 1, Venice 1571.

179 esset] cesset *ante corr.* D cesset E **180** est] *om.* DE || indeterminata] et determinata E
 || rationi] rei E **181** a ratione] *om.* A || autem] *om.* DE || necessario] *in marg.* intensus
add. sed exp. D intensus E necessarius B **184** et non] *om.*(!) AF || Et] *sup. l.* D *om.* E
 || est] *sup. l.* C **185** imaginatio] imago E **185–186** actu... modum] *hom. F* **185** actu]
 actum BC **186** modus] potentiae *add.* F **187** quaerere] quare BCE quare *ante corr.* D et
 cetera *add.* E **188** talis] iste F || in actu vel] *om.* F || aliquid] aliquis F **189** est] enim
 D || eam] ipsam F **190** Et... actum] *hom. F* **192** loquamur] *in marg.* D *om.* E ||
 tertio] *om.* A **193** ipsius] ipse A **194** in] ipso *add.* A || actu] actum E || secundam]
 potentia *add. sed exp.* C **195** ab] *om.* D || simul] *om.* E || secundum prima] *om.* D
 || talis] quia *add. sed ras.* D quia *add. sed exp.* E **196** enim] *sup. l.* E || in] *om.* F
198 quod] *om.* DE || elicitur] *in marg.* C **199** ponit] positus C || Quod] et E **200**
 potentiae] ponitur E || quae] qui CF **201** sine] sive F || intellectivo] intellectivus F ||
 animalia] *om.* F **202** sunt angeli] in angelis A || est] et A || in hominibus] *om.* F ||
 per] ad *add. sed exp.* F **204** vel conditio] *om.* F || vel] avel *ante corr.* E || et] *om.* DE
205 obiectum] *in marg.* certam(?) *add. sed ras.* D certam E || et] *sup. l.* E || difficilis]
 vero *add.* A **206** Ergo] secundo E || et] *dad add. sed ras.* D ad *add.* E **207** uniformis]
 informis BCDEF **208** quae] quia DEF || difficultas] *sup. l.* facilitas *add. sed exp.* F

conditio portantis et non actus nec obiecti. Et simile est in proposito quia habitus
 210 est quaedam perfectio habentis vel saltem removens prohibens vel impedimentum.
 Cum ergo hic modus non sit conditio actus, ut dictum est, relinquitur quod non
 causetur in actu nec a solo habitu, ut dicit SECUNDA OPINIO, nec a potentia simul
 cum habitu, ut dicit PRIMA, sed causatur in potentia ex praecedentibus actibus. Et
 fortassis iste modus non est aliud quam ipse habitus.

215 **23.** Patet ergo quomodo habitus se habet ad ponendum modum in actu, quia per
 modum inclinantis et quasi applicantis potentiam ad determinatum obiectum—et sic
 (F 11r) ponit modum qui est bene vel male—vel per modum removentis prohibens—
 et sic ponit modum intensionis. Et utroque modo habitus tantum facit ad essentiam
 actus quantum ad modum eius. Dicitur tamen requiri propter modum et non propter
 220 actum, quia potentia sine habitu non haberet talem et tam certam determinationem
 ad determinatum obiectum, sed nunc ferretur in unum nunc in aliud, nec eliceret
 actum ita intensum. Nec ista est differentia rationis vel adaptationis solum sed realis
 sic intelligendo et non ut PRIMI INTELLIGUNT.

24. Ad rationes SECUNDAE OPINIONIS, quae videntur probare quod habitus nihil
 225 faciat ad essentiam actus, dicendum ad primam quod potentia appetitiva non-
 impedita potest in omne appetere quantum ad essentiam actus circumscripto habitu.
 Nec propter hoc tamen sequitur quod habitus nihil faciat ad essentiam actus nisi
 de actu qui eliceretur a potentia nondum perfecta per habitum. Sed de actu elicito
 post habitum non est verum, quia habitus (C 93va) non ponit modum circa actum
 230 tamquam quamdam perfectionem ab essentia (D 36va) actus differentem, sed quia
 determinat potentiam ad obiectum bonum (si sit bonus habitus) vel ad malum (si
 sit malus habitus), et potentia applicata elicit actum bonum vel (F 11v) malum qui
 dicitur actus modificatus. Et totus actus est a potentia ut eliciente et ab habitu ut
 determinante et inclinante potentiam. Ponit etiam habitus intensionem in actu quae
 235 non differt ab essentia actus.

25. Ad secundum dicendum quod in nobis aut non est subiective aliqua potestas
 supernaturalis conficiendi sed a sola virtute divina est effectus cuiuslibet sacramenti

225 ad primam] *supra* n. 12. **236** Ad secundum] *supra* n. 13.

209 portantis] *repl.* B **210** removens] removentis F || vel] et A *om.* DE **211** ergo] igitur DE || hic] *om.* E || non sit] et insit E **212** in] ab AF || habitu] obiecto A || dicit] *om.* F || nec] vel D ut E **212–213** simul cum] et F **213** habitu] simul *add.* F || ut dicit] cum F || prima] opinio *add.* A opinione *add.* F **214** iste] ille F **216** quasi] *om.* AF || applicantis] determinantis F || potentiam] obiectum *add.* F || ad determinatum] vel applicantis in F || obiectum] determinatum *add.* F **217** qui] quid E **218** Et] cum F || modo] *om.* F **219** eius] *om.* F || propter] pro *ante corr.* C in *marg.* mod(?) *add.* *sed ras.* D || modum] incertum(?) E **220** tam certam] tantam F **221** determinatum] determinandum B tale F || sed] si DF || nunc] non DE || eliceret] haberat F **222** intensum] in omne sum(?) E || ista] illa F || rationis] tantum *add.* F || adaptationis] in *marg.* ad apositionis *add.* *sed ras.* D || solum] *om.* F **223** sic] *om.* BCE *sup. l.* D || intelligendo] ut dictum est cum *add.* D ut dictum est *add.* E || et non] *om.* D **224** secundae opinionis] in oppositum F **225** faciat] facit ADF **227** nihil] non *sup. l.* C *om.* DE **228** eliceretur] elicitur F || nondum] in *marg.* modum *add.* D modum E **229** circa actum] *om.* AF **231** si] *om.* F **232** habitus] *om.* ABC || bonum] *om.* B **233** ut] *om.* C **234** quae] aut *ante corr.* C autem E **236** est] *sup. l.* C || subiective] *om.* F **237** supernaturalis] vel *add.* F || conficiendi] cuius Christi *add.* A subiective *add.* F || sed] vel F || a] ex F || sacramenti] in *marg.* sa(?) *add.* *sed ras.* D

aut si sit aliqua non est simile de potentia supernaturali et de habitu supernaturali qui est gratia vel caritas et de actu naturali et habitu acquisito, quia modus quem ponit habitus supernaturalis non est idem essentialiter cum actu potentiae supernaturalis sed est sola acceptatio divina per quam opera nostra facta in caritate sunt meritoria. Et ideo hic modus potest esse ab habitu—dato quod ab eo non sit actus. Modus autem quem ponit habitus acquisitus circa actum potentiae incidit in idem cum actu, (E 41va) et ideo (A 109ra) quidquid est causa unius est causa alterius.

245 **26.** Ad tertium patet responsio quia non ponimus differentiam inter potentiam et habitum secundum rationem tantum sed realem ut ex dictis patet.

Ad rationes principales

250 **27.** Ad rationes principales iam patet aliquialiter solutio, duae enim primae sunt pro conclusione nostra quamvis (F 12r) prima supponat falsum, scilicet quod habitus generetur ex actibus praecedentibus ratione essentiae actuum—quod non est verum, sed propter frequentationem et assuefactionem eorum ut ALII DICUNT, et in hoc bene.

255 **28.** Secunda etiam quae dicit quod scire est a scientia ut actus secundus a primo—potest concedi eo modo quo concessum est actum sequentem habitum causari ab habitu, (C 93vb) scilicet per modum inclinantis et applicantis potentiam, et non ut ALII PRIUS DIXERUNT distinguentes inter actum et modum qui importatur per “scire”, talis enim distinctio non potest esse realis sed rationis tantum.

260 **29.** Ad primam rationem alterius partis patet responsio, expositum est enim qualiter illud dictum ARISTOTELIS intelligitur—potentia est qua possumus, habitus vero quo bene vel male. Hoc enim non dicitur propter realem differentiam actus et modi (B 129va) eius sed quia indifferentiam potentiae. Habitus determinant ad unum—ad bonum si sit bonus et ad malum si sit malus.

30. Ad aliam rationem sufficienter respondetur a PRIMIS.

Question 1: Do we need habits?

245 Ad tertium] *supra* n. 14. 248 duae enim primae] *supra* nn. 1 et 2. 249 prima] *supra* n. 1. 251 ut alii dicunt] *supra* op. 2a, n. 16. 253 Secunda] *supra* n. 2. 256 alii prius dixerunt] *supra* op. 2a, n. 17. 258 Ad primam rationem alterius partis] *supra* n. 3. 259–260 potentia ... male] ARISTOTELES, *Eth. ad Nic.* II.5 1105b24–28. 263 Ad aliam rationem] *supra* n. 4. || primis] *supra* op. 1a, n. 10.

238 aliqua] *om.* CDE || de] *om.* F 240 idem] supernaturaliter *add. sed ras.* D || potentiae] ponitur E 241 opera nostra] nostra operatio C 242 potest] *in marg.* ponit *add. sed ras.* D || actus] *sup.* l. F 243 actu] potentiae *add.* AF 245 tertium] secundam A || responsio] solutio F 246 tantum] solum AF || dictis] praedictis F 248 iam] ideo DE || enim] *om.* A || primae] potentiae B potentiae *ante corr.* C potentiae *praem.* DE 249 scilicet] *om.* F || quod] si *add.* F 251 propter] per D semper E ratione F || et assuefactionem] *om.* F || et] *om.* C vel DE 253 quod scire] *om.* B || a primo] *om.* DE 255 inclinantis] inclinationis D || applicantis] *post corr.* F 256 alii prius] primi A || prius] primi F 257 scire] *in marg.* scientiam(?) *add. sed ras.* D || talis] *in marg.* D || distinctio] *sup.* l. conditio *add. sed ras.* F 259 intelligitur] intelligendum B intelligatur F || est] *om.* D enim E 260 vero] *om.* DE || quo] ad *add.* DE || vel] ad *add. sed ras.* D || dicitur] debet E 262 unum ad] actum A || et] *om.* CDE 263 a] ex F || primis] praemissis F

1. CUM VERO SUPRA HABITUM SIT ETC. *Distinctio 23a*. In this *distinctio* we will investigate three issues. The first concerns habits in general; the second is about faith in particular; and the third concerns the form (or lack of form) involved with faith. On the first, two questions are raised. The first is: Do we need habits?

2. IT SEEMS THAT WE DO NOT. Acts that come before a habit are exactly like acts that come after the habit except in terms of ease (*facilitas*); however, we do not need habits in order to account for this; therefore, we do not need habits at all. The major premise comes from *Ethics 2* where it is explicitly stated that acts that come before and generate the habit are like acts that are performed after the habit has been generated, except that the mark (*signum*) of a generated habit is feeling pleasure in the task (which is an effect of the act's ease and naturalness). The minor premise is made clear: the hardship of an act contributes to its merit whereas its ease diminishes its merit; hence, if a habit only affects the ease in an act, it harms more than benefits. If, however, one were to say—as was often said—that hardship on the side of the task adds to merit (and a habit does not take this away) whereas hardship on the side of the one doing the task does not add to but diminishes merit (and a habit does take this sort of hardship away)—CONTRA: according to the view of our Lord in Mark 12:42 and Luke 21:2 the widow who was able to give two coins in alms merited more than the rich who gave many, for it was harder for her to give that little amount than for them to give so much. But it is agreed that this hardship was not owing to the kind of task involved but it was rather owing to something on the side of the one doing the task, since she was poor. Therefore, such hardship adds to merit.

3. Again: rational powers are more perfect than natural powers;²¹ but natural powers do not need habits, neither for the sake of the act nor its ease or mode; therefore, rational powers also do not need habits.

4. ON THE CONTRARY. A habit is that by which someone is disposed better or worse towards himself or towards something else, as is stated in *Metaphysics 5*; but we need that by which we are disposed better; therefore, we need good habits at least.

5. RESPONSE. Three things ought to be looked into in this question. First, since “habit” is said in many ways, in what sense of “habit” is the term being used here? Second, why should we countenance habits? Third, what is a habit? Is it a thing in the strict sense or a mode of a thing?

art. 1: In what sense of “habit” is the term being used here?

6. In connection with the first, it ought to be known that “habit” is said in three ways: (1) as a post-categorical item; (2) as a categorical item; or (3) as a certain kind of Quality. This can be shown as follows. “Habit” is said from having;²² however, the noun “habit” is derived from having in two ways. (a) In one way, when a human being or any given creature is said to have some thing. (b) In another way, when some thing somehow is related (e.g. better or worse) either to itself or to something else.²³

²¹ Usually, medieval authors took the intellect and the will to be rational powers.

²² In Latin, “*habitus*” is also the past participle formed from the verb “*habere*”.

²³ English misses out on one use of “*habere*” in the Latin expression “*se habere ad*”—to be related to.

45 **7. [a]** “Habit” said in the first way [i.e. someone has something] is a post-categorical item, since its scope includes things that fall into different categories, for a human is said to have a hand (which falls into the category of Substance); some quantity or whiteness (which belong to the two other [absolute] categories), and a lord is said to have a servant (which falls into the category of Relation), and a human to have clothes or a ring (which fall into the category of Habit, which is
50 its own category, as will be discussed below in a moment). In fact, all the ways in which one thing is said to have another can be reduced to three, for that which is had is had (i) in the manner of an inherent accident (and this includes things that belong to many different categories); (ii) in the manner of a correlative (and this can be reduced to the category of Relation); or (iii) in the manner of equipment (and this,
55 since it is not reduced to some other category, constitutes its own category, called Habit, as a human is said to be armed or clothed and the like).

8. [b] However, “habit” taken in the second way, that is, when a thing is said to be related better or worse to itself or something else, is a kind of Quality, called habit or disposition. “Habit” said in this way is different from the two primary ways
60 [i.e. (1) and (2) above, namely as a post-categorical item or as a categorical item in the category of Habit] since “habit” in the two primary ways is not said of the thing which is had but only of the connection between what has and what is had, whereas in this third way “habit” is first and primarily said of the thing which is had inasmuch as the one who has it is said to be related somehow (e.g. better or worse).
65

9. This is how the Philosopher defines a habit in *Metaphysics* 5: a habit is a disposition according to which someone is disposed better or worse with respect to himself or with respect to something else. And in *Ethics* 2 it is said that a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. And it is in this sense that we discuss habits here with the question: Do we need
70 habits?

10. [Additio P] However, according to the Commentator commenting on *Metaphysics* 5 the relative aspect or connection that constitutes the category of Habit is a connection that consists in the having of something such that what is contained has what contains it, e.g. an animal has fur or trees have bark, and this is the category
75 of Habit.²⁴ But when the bucket has water or the city people, it is the other way around, that is, what contains has what is contained, and in this way a place has what is placed there, and this is the category of Location,²⁵ and in general, the relative aspect in this category is the converse of the one in the category of Habit.

11. And so the first article is clear.

80 **art. 2: Why should we countenance habits?**

12. In connection with the second question, it ought to be said that a habit is required because of the lack of determination in a thing that is disposed towards something else. The reason for this is as follows. A habit, as is clear from what has already been said, is that by which someone is disposed better or worse. Hence,

²⁴ I.e. Habit (*Habitus*) is the relationship of what is contained to what contains it.

²⁵ I.e. Location (*Ubi*) is the relationship of what contains to what is contained.

85 if there is no indifference with respect to better or worse in a thing from its very
 nature but rather the thing has one determinate mode [in which it behaves], then a
 habit is not necessary. Conversely, if there is an indifference in the thing from its
 very nature with respect to better or worse, then a habit is necessary in order to
 explain its determinate mode.²⁶ Now, the rational powers in us are not from their
 90 very nature determined to one mode (in terms of better or worse) but rather they are
 quite indifferent, for the intellect can think truly or falsely²⁷ and the will can desire
 better or worse. Hence, we do need habits in the rational powers (be they essentially
 rational or rational by way of participation)²⁸ in order to determine by the habit this
 indifference. However, a habit determines insofar as it inclines the power towards a
 95 determinate mode (better if it is a good habit or worse if it is a bad habit). And this is
 what the Philosopher tells us in *Ethics 2* when he maintains that there is a difference
 between habits and powers, saying that according to a habit we are said to be good
 or bad whereas according to powers we are not.

13. [Additio P] Based on this, so they say,²⁹ one has sufficient grounds to draw
 100 the inference that it is not, perhaps, necessary to maintain that there are habits in
 the intellect with regard to [first] principles, for the intellect is already determined
 with respect to such principles, since they come to the mind almost naturally
 (*Metaphysics 4*) and are like the door to a house: “Who could miss it?” (*Metaphysics*
 2). That is to say: Nobody! This should chiefly be understood in the case of absolute
 105 first principles where the terms involve being in the case of objects of speculative
 thought; and perhaps no less in the case of objects of deliberation, since reason
 always evaluates things with an eye towards the best—hence we praise the reasoning
 of the continent and the incontinent alike (towards the end of *Ethics 1*). One can also
 deduce, perhaps, a second thesis from this: that we ought not countenance habits in
 110 the power of the will: not owing to the passions in virtue of which it can be related
 worse, for no passion is in the will; not owing to its indetermination as a rational
 power, for this is taken away when the intellect presents to it its object and the object
 determines the power. If one were to raise the objection that the rational appetite or
 the imagination determines the intellect according to the Philosopher (*Metaphysics*
 115 9) and so it is not determined by the object, we would say in reply that the intellect
 determines the will in a different manner than the will determines the intellect, for
 the intellect determines the will when it specifies its act whereas the will determines
 the intellect when it makes it carry out its act.

²⁶ I.e. as that which explains the thing’s acting better or worse when it acts better or worse.

²⁷ I.e. better or worse.

²⁸ Usually, the intellect and will were taken to be essentially rational whereas imagination and memory in the body, since they are under the direct control of the intellect/will, were taken to be rational by participation. Hence, there can be habits in our (sensitive) memory and imagination, and in animals too, albeit with the proviso that such habits in animals derive ultimately from (human) intellects/wills, i.e. the humans that train the animals to develop those habits.

²⁹ As this text is only found in Palude’s presentation of Durand’s position, we should take “they” here to be Durand.

14. And so the second article is clear.

120 **art. 3: What is a habit?**

15. In connection with the third, it ought to be said that a habit—at least an acquired habit, setting aside supernatural and infused habits—is not strictly speaking some absolute nature but rather it is a mode of a thing or nature (*modus rei vel naturae*). This is clear as follows.

125 **16. [1]** Just as a thing is related to a thing, so too a mode to a mode; but a habit is not required except for the sake of a mode; therefore it is not a thing, strictly speaking, but a mode.

130 **17. [2]** The same is clear in second way if we compare bodily habits with habits of the soul: health (a bodily habit) does not seem to be itself an absolute nature but rather it is merely the right combination or proportion, that is, a determinate relationship among the humors; therefore, likewise, so it seems, with habits of the soul.

135 **18. [3]** The same is clear in a third way with habits of the soul in particular. *Metaphysics* 9 states that an immanent act produces nothing; however immanent acts, through their frequent repetition (*frequentia*), cause habits; therefore, a habit is not strictly speaking a thing but rather it is a mode left behind by such frequent repetition.

140 **19. [4]** Fourth: an item that is acquired through the frequent repetition of acts and lost only when acts stop is not (so it seems) a thing but rather a customary mode (*modus consuetudinis*); but all acquired habits are like this; therefore etc. The minor premise is clear on its own, for we experience that after going a long time without acting, we will lose our moral and speculative habits. The major premise is proved: if an item is a thing, then it will only stop existing if it is destroyed: when its subject is destroyed, or when its contrary acts, or when its efficient cause stops; however, habits are lost when their acts stop without the destruction [of their subject] or the action of a contrary, and the acts are not the conserving cause of the habits, otherwise habits would not remain in those who sleep (where the acts have stopped). Hence, habits are not strictly speaking things but rather they are customary modes.

150 **20.** However, we should imagine that just as a horse is trained to trot inasmuch as it becomes apt at trotting from the custom (*consuetudo*) of trotting (and no absolute thing is effected in it from this but rather a mere customary mode and aptitude) so too from the custom of performing good or bad acts an aptitude for doing similar acts comes about in us, for custom inclines almost by nature.

155 **21.** However, because of this it must seem to some people that a habit, then, would not be a quality since it is not a thing strictly speaking but a mode of a thing. However, this is not the case, for not only are Relation and the last six categories modes of things, but also some items can be found in Quality and Quantity that are not things strictly speaking but real modes. Number, for instance, in Quantity, for this is not a thing strictly speaking over and above the enumerated things but it is a real mode. Likewise, in Quality: shape, which is placed in the fourth species of Quality, is the mode of the termination of quantity and not a thing in itself. And the same is the case with habits and dispositions, which are placed in the first species

of Quality, for these are nothing but ways of being apt being related better or worse to oneself or something else. This seems to be what the Philosopher explicitly says in *Physics* 7 where he proves that change is not [terminated] at a quality of the first species, that is, at a habit or disposition, for he says, “Every virtue or vice is something that exists with respect to some other item. Indeed, health is a particular combination of hot and cold items (or of those items that are contained within them).” The same thing should be understood with habits of the soul. And so he concludes, “Therefore, vices and virtues are with respect to some other item; but these are not generations nor is there generation nor change at all with respect to them.” Indeed, the categories are not distinguished in terms of thing and mode nor in terms of thing [and thing], but in terms of the forms of predication. Therefore, whatever is such that through it its subject is somehow disposed with respect to itself or with respect to something else, be it a thing strictly speaking or a mode of a thing, is said to be a quality, since it makes its subject be qualified somehow. Likewise, whatever is such that it denominates its subject as some amount or some number is said to be a quantity, even granted that in some cases it is not strictly speaking a thing in itself, as was said about number.

180 **Response to the opening arguments**

22. To the first argument, it ought to be said that we need habits in order to account for the ease and the determination of a power to a certain mode. When it is said that ease diminishes merit, it ought to be said that this is not true in the case of ease that is on the side of the one doing the task—which is the sort of ease that a habit explains. Quite the contrary, such ease adds to merit, under the assumption that the task is the same, since it adds to how voluntary it is. However, all things being equal, the ease of a task diminishes merit and its hardship adds to merit. As to the objection about the widow by giving two coins merited more than the rich who gave many—it ought to be said that this is true, because it was harder for her to give that little amount than it was for the rich to give more. However, this hardship was not from the condition of the one doing the task (as was argued) but rather from the condition of the task, for poverty is not a condition of person but rather it is a scarcity of fortune. Hence, by comparing what the widow gave to what remained to her she gave more than the rich to whom more remained in proportion [to what they had], by not just taking into account the proportion of person to person but of thing given to what remains.

23. To the second argument, it ought to be said that natural powers do not need habits, neither in connection with the substance of the act nor in connection with a mode, since from their very nature they are brought into their own acts in just one mode. But the rational powers, since they are indeterminate with respect to different modes, do need habits determining them. Nor, because of this, are the latter less perfect than natural powers—rather they are more perfect, since this indifference is rooted in their freedom and universality.

Question 2: Do acquired habits, with respect to the performance of subsequent acts, contribute to the essence of the act or just to a mode?

1. The second question is: Do acquired habits, with respect to the performance of subsequent acts, contribute to the essence of the act or just to a mode?³⁰ IT SEEMS THAT A HABIT IS the cause of the performance of the subsequent act's essence: a habit is acquired from acts that are similar to each other, and an acquired habit, in turn, produces acts that are similar as well; but a habit is acquired from acts in connection with the essence of those acts and not by reason of the mode, for the acts that come before the habit are not modified (*modificati*); therefore, it seems that an acquired habit is the cause of the subsequent act in connection with its essence.³¹

2. Again: first act is the cause of second act in connection with to what it is;³² but dispositional knowledge (*scientia*), which is an intellectual habit, is related to episodic knowing (*scire*) as first act to second; therefore, it is its cause in connection with what it is, and so too, by the same line of reasoning, with other habits, so it seems.

3. ON THE CONTRARY: according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2 a power is that by which we can [perform] an act whereas a habit is that by which we can [perform it] better or worse. Therefore, if a habit is that by which we can without qualification [perform] an act in connection with its essence, then a habit will not be a habit but rather a power, and so the difference between a habit and a power will vanish.

4. Again: a habit contributes only to that in virtue of which we need it; but we need a habit only to explain the mode, and so a habit is not required when a power's mode is determined by its nature, as was shown in the last question. Therefore, a habit contributes nothing to the act except insofar as it explains a mode.

5. RESPONSE. Concerning this issue there are two theories.

Opinion 1 (Hervaeus's)

6. One theory holds that, in the performance of an act, both the power and the habit really contribute to both the essence of the act and its mode such that each is from both [the power and the habit] together as two items that, on their own, are imperfect agents but together constitute one perfect agent. However, by reason of a kind of appropriation, the essence of the act is attributed to the power whereas its mode is attributed to the habit.³³

³⁰ A wordy way to put the point, but as we'll see it isn't clear what the essence of the act and the mode of the act mean. The general question here is whether the habit's job, so to say, is to simply explain a feature or modification (mode) of the act, like, say, its goodness, whereas the power explains the very existence (essence) of the act itself. The first view (Hervaeus's) holds that the habit together with the power cause both the essence and the mode; the second view (Godfrey's) holds that whereas the habit explains (causes) the mode, the power causes the essence.

³¹ The idea here is that the habit causes the act to be the sort of act it is. It isn't as if some other item (the power say) causes the act to be the sort of act it is and the habit merely modifies or qualifies that act.

³² I.e. its quiddity or essence.

³³ This view holds three theses. First, it maintains that a habit causes *both* the essence of acts and their modes. Second, it holds the partial-cause thesis: that habit and power are joint but partial causes. Third, it maintains the appropriation thesis: that we do find it appropriate to point to the power as responsible for the essence and the habit for the mode.

7. The first thesis [i.e. the partial-cause thesis] is proved as follows. When two principles work together with respect to one simple act such that neither on its own is sufficient for performing that act (or at least so perfectly) it is necessary that such an act (according to the whole of what is in it) come about from both of them and not from one of them with respect to one [aspect] and the other with respect to another [aspect]. However, in performing a virtuous act coming after a virtuous habit both the power and the virtuous habit work together such that neither on its own is sufficient for performing that act (or at least so perfectly). Hence, the virtuous act (according to the whole of what is in it) is from both together—in connection with both its essence and its mode—and it is not from the power with regard to one of these and the habit with regard to the other. The major premise is supported with an argument and an example. The argument: in a simple item there is not one and another [different item], and so every simple item (according to the whole of what is in it) comes about either from one [agent] or from two [agents] that constitute one [agent] but not such that one [aspect] comes about from one of these and another [aspect] comes about from the other. The example: a knife's hardness and sharpness are both required in order for it to cut something, for hardness without sharpness would be insufficient, and so too sharpness without hardness. Certainly, the whole act of cutting is from both together and not from one of them in connection with one [aspect] and from the other in connection with some other. And so the major premise is clear. The minor premise is obvious since a virtuous act that comes after a habit is one act as simple as any act that came before the habit, for the essence of an act and its mode are not two things in a virtuous act but just one thing. As well, in order to perform this act (or so perfectly) a habit is insufficient without a power and so too a power is insufficient without a habit, for otherwise one or the other of them would be superfluous. Therefore etc. Hence, both power and habit work together in performing a perfect act such that the act as a whole in terms of both its essence and mode comes about from both together, since they constitute a single perfect agent.

8. However, owing to a kind of appropriation, we attribute the generation of the act in connection with its essence to the power and in connection with its mode to the habit. There are two reasons for this. [1] When two principles, one of which presupposes the other, work together [to perform] one act, then the essence of the act is appropriated to the presupposed principle whereas its mode is appropriated to the one that presupposes the other just as in the act itself the mode presupposes the essence. Since, then, a habit presupposes a power and not the other way around, it follows that the essence of the act is attributed to the power whereas its mode to the habit. [2] When two principles work together [to perform] one act, one of which is more indeterminate than the other (which is more determinate), then the essence of the act is attributed through appropriation to the more indeterminate principle whereas the mode to the more determinate principle, for in the act itself the mode is, so to say, a certain sort of determination of the essence of the act. But the power is the more indeterminate principle whereas the habit is the more determinate principle. Hence, the essence of the act is attributed to the power through appropriation whereas the mode is attributed to the habit.

75 9. Following this position, one might answer the opening arguments for the
 contrary as follows. To the first argument, when it is said that a power is that by
 which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse”, they say
 that in a simple act (like a virtuous act) the whole (that is, the essence of the act
 and its mode) really is from the power and the whole really is from the habit even
 80 though according to appropriation the essence is attributed to the power and the
 mode to the habit. And when it is said that “then the habit would not be a habit
 but a power” they say that this is true: a habit is a kind of power. This is why
 the Philosopher in *On the Soul* 3 and in *Physics* 8 says that someone who has
 dispositional knowledge (*scientia*) is, by it, in accidental potency (*potentia*) with
 85 respect to episodes of knowing (*scire*); since a habit is an accidental potency, it
 presupposes another prior potency which is first and more truly called a potency,
 namely, essential potency.³⁴ That this is what must be said is proved: the mode of
 an act (with regard to which the habit contributes) either is the same as the essence
 of the act or not. If it is the same, then it follows that whatever is the cause of the
 90 mode of an act is the cause of its essence. If it is not the same, then it follows that
 the habit is a kind of power, since whatever is a principle of performing an act has
 the characteristics of a power, as is clear from the definition of power. Hence, if the
 mode is different from the essence of the act and the habit is the causal principle of
 the mode, it follows that the habit is a kind of power.

95 10. To the second, they say that even though the habit is required just to explain
 the mode, nevertheless since the essence of the act and the mode coincide in the
 same item in reality it is necessary that which is the cause of the one be the cause
 of the other, even though conceptually the causation of the [essence of the] act is
 appropriated more to the power whereas the causation of the mode to the habit.

100 Op. 2 (Godfrey’s)

11. The second theory maintains that the power alone is the cause of the essence
 of the act whereas the habit alone is the cause of the mode of the act. There are three
 arguments in defense of this theory.³⁵

105 12. [1] Every power can [perform] an act proportionate to it without some other
 item added to it which has the characteristics of a principle for performing it;
 however, the intellectual power is related to the act of thinking in connection with
 its essence as to an act proportionate to it, and likewise the appetitive power is
 related to the act of desiring in connection with its essence as to an act proportionate
 to it; therefore the intellectual power can [perform] every act of thinking and the
 110 appetitive power every act of desiring in connection with the essence of such acts
 without some item added to them which has the characteristics of a principle for

³⁴ The Latin term “*potentia*” can sometimes mean power and sometimes potency.

³⁵ Hence, op. 2 holds at least: (1) A habit causes the mode whereas a power causes the essence.
 (2) The total cause thesis: A habit is the total cause of the mode; a power is the total cause of
 the essence. As we’ll see below he also denies the appropriation thesis, and so holds (3) the non-
 appropriation thesis: The causation of the essence is really (not conceptually or appropriately)
 attributed to the power whereas the causation of the mode is really (not conceptually/appropriately)
 attributed to the habit.

performing such acts. Now, I said “without some item added to them which has the characteristics of a principle for performing” because the intellective or appetitive power cannot transition into its act without the removal of the impediment (if there is one) and the presence of the object. But these are not principles for performing the act; rather the power alone is.

13. [2] Just as a supernatural power is related to a supernatural habit, so a natural power to a natural habit—provided we call a “natural habit” a habit that is acquired from natural [acts], which is what we are talking about here; but a supernatural power alone is the principle for performing a supernatural act in connection with the essence of the act whereas a supernatural habit alone contributes to the mode of the act; therefore, likewise, with natural powers and acquired habits. The major premise is clear by analogy. The minor is made clear: through a supernatural power alone (e.g. through the power for consecration) there comes about an act of consecration; but through charity (which is a supernatural habit) nothing comes about with regard to the previously mentioned act in connection with of its essence but all that is added is a mode, viz. to consecrate with merit. So the minor premise is clear. So the conclusion follows.

14. [3] The Philosopher in *Ethics* 2 means to draw a real distinction between powers and habits and not a mere conceptual distinction or a distinction according to adaptation. But the distinction that he draws is that a power is that by which we can [perform an act] whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. Hence, in this way a habit is really distinct from a power—the power performs just the act whereas the habit just the mode—and not merely distinct through adaptation as the first opinion has it.

15. In support of this opinion there seem to be many passages from Aristotle: *Metaphysics* 5, *Ethics* 2, and many other passages, at least *prima facie*.

16. As to the arguments that run against this opinion [i.e. the opening arguments above], it is said that the first argument is just as much against the first opinion as it is against the second opinion, for if something can only cause what is like that from which it was caused, it follows that a habit cannot cause the promptness, ease, or a mode in those acts that come after [the habit], since the acts that come before and cause the habit did not have such modes—yet the first opinion holds that the habit does cause such a mode, albeit not on its own. Hence, the argument runs against them just as much as it does against the second opinion. What one should say, then, in reply is that a habit is not caused by the acts that come before [it] by reason of the essence of those acts (absolutely speaking) but rather it is caused from their frequent repetition. From such repetition a certain disposition is caused in the appetite through which it more firmly and promptly transitions into the same acts as before, for custom (*consuetudo*) and the frequent repetition (*frequentatio*) of acts causes this with regard to any power.

17. To the second, it can be said that in that which is an episode of knowing (*scire*) there are two items, to wit, the act of thinking (*intelligere*) (which pertains to the essence of the act) and the act of thinking like so (*sic intelligere*), that is, correctly and infallibly (which pertains to the mode of the act). Therefore, someone who has dispositional knowledge (*scientia*) as first act by reason of that dispositional

knowledge is in potency with respect to an episode of knowing (which is second act) but not in connection with the essence of the act but in connection with the mode just stated, and the cause of that mode as second act is dispositional knowledge as first act.

Op. 3 (Durand's)

18. We should look into what truth each opinion contains and where each falls short, concerning which we will proceed as follows. (1) First, we will show what these modes are (which are found in an act performed by a power perfected by a habit) and how many of them there are. (2) Second, we will derive in each mode an answer to our question: Can a habit cause such a mode even if it does nothing at all with respect to the essence of the act?

Op. 3, art. 1: What are these modes and how many are there?

19. In connection with the first question, it ought to be known that there are three kinds of modes to be found in an act performed by a power perfected by a habit. One mode is the intensity of the act, for an act that comes after the habit (be it good or bad) seems to be more intense than an act that comes before and generates the habit, the reason for which will be given below. The second mode is the fact that such an act is precisely in concord with right reason or precisely in discord with it, the former is an act performed by a power perfected by a virtuous habit, the latter is an act performed by a power disposed by a vicious habit. However, a power without a habit indifferently performs now one of these and now the other. It is this mode that the Philosopher talks about in *Ethics* 2 when he tells us that a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. The third mode is the fact that the act that comes after the habit is performed with more ease or pleasure than the act that comes before the habit, performed by the naked power, as is clear, likewise, from *Ethics* 2. So much for the first article.

Op. 3, art. 2: Does a habit cause the mode?

20. Concerning the second question, it ought to be said that if we are talking about the first mode (which consists in the intensity of the act) then, yes, a habit contributes to the essence of the act just as much as it contributes to the mode and vice versa. This is clear, briefly, because the intensity of the act (and of any form) is something in connection with the essence of the act (or form) and not something added to it, as was proved in Book 1, Distinction 17.³⁶ Hence, nothing can have an affect on this mode that does not also affect the essence of the act, and so the habit contributes to this mode as much as it contributes to the essence of the act. But a habit contributes to this mode (i.e. the intensity) in the manner of something that removes an impediment, for the intellectual and sensitive appetites are directed at objects that are contraries, and so each of them is weakened in its

³⁶ Durand defends the thesis (with Scotus) that the intensity of a given form is not something absolute added to the form; rather forms come in degrees and those degrees are part of the essence of those forms.

195 act because of the other appetite, for each appetite undergoes a hardship in its act
 owing to its being dragged to the contrary object by the other appetite.³⁷ Since, then,
 a virtuous habit makes the sensitive appetite obey reason and not be something that
 drags reason to a contrary object—as it was before—it, thus, removes what was
 200 before a kind of impediment to the intellective appetite’s being brought intensely
 into the object in concord with right reason. Likewise, a vicious habit (through
 which the intellective appetite is in concord with the sensitive appetite) removes
 what impeded the sensitive appetite from being brought so intensely into its object.
 Hence, habits—both vicious and virtuous—contribute to the intensity of the act in
 the manner of something that removes an impediment. But how can it be a *per se*
 205 cause [as opposed to a mere *per accidens* cause]?³⁸ I do not see an answer to this
 question, unless, perhaps, it is because by reason of the habit the object appears
 more fitting to the power, and a power is apt to be brought more intensely into an
 object shown under the aspect of what is better and more fitting.

210 **21.** If we are talking about the second mode [sc. the moral determination of the
 act],³⁹ then it ought to be said that this mode is not a mode of the act but a mode
 of the power, for the power is what is determined to such-and-such an act by a
 habit whereas the act is not determined to some mode. The reason for this: An item
 that determines some other item formally exists in the item able to be determined
 (which is in itself indifferent, for otherwise it would not be able to be determined
 215 but it would rather, by its very nature, already be determined). However, a [rational]
 power is indeterminate in itself such that it tends to an object in concord with reason
 or in discord with reason while a deliberate act is not indifferent in this way—rather
 it is already determined to one of the two, as was shown in Book 2. Therefore, the
 mode that consists in such determination is a mode of the power and it is in the
 220 power which is determined to such-and-such an act, and it is not a mode of the act
 or in the act. And so what they believe in is a kind of tall tale, to wit, that a habit
 explains this mode in the act. Quite the contrary, the habit explains a mode of the
 power or, rather, it just is that mode. It is for this reason that there is no question:
 Does what contributes to the essence of the act also contribute to this mode? For this
 225 assumes that this mode is in the act or a feature of the act, which is false. Rather,
 it is only in the power as what inclines and determines the power to such-and-such
 an act. Hence, a habit contributes to the act only in the manner of what inclines or
 determines the power.

³⁷ For instance, my intellective appetite (will) desires that I be chaste, but my sensitive appetite desires the opposite of that, and so my sensitive appetite “drags” my intellective appetite towards fornication and my intellective appetite “drags” my sensitive appetite towards chastity. This tug-of-war is discussed in detail in Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *TDH* q. 4, a. 9, ed. Koch.

³⁸ An item that removes an impediment is a *per accidens* as opposed to a *per se* cause, for its causal role is very indirect. The notion of a *per accidens* (sometimes *sine qua non* cause) was debated. See Hartman 2014.

³⁹ Durand here only talks about the moral determination of the act here (as good or bad). In *Sent. C III*, d. 23 and *TDH* q. 2, he also considers the, so to say, epistemic determination of the act (as true or false) and the intentional determination of the act (as of or about this rather than that). For some discussion here, see Hartman (forthcoming).

230 **22.** If we are talking about the third mode (i.e. the aptness and ease in performing an act), then each of the previous two opinions falls short, since they suppose that this mode belongs to the act or is in the act and that it is caused by the habit alone (according to the second opinion) or by the habit and the power together (according to the first opinion). But this is not true. This mode (i.e. the aptness or ease) is not a mode of the act or in the act but rather it is a mode of the power. However, there is a connection to the act, for when it is said that a habit is that by which the act is easily performed this ease is not a mode of the act but rather a mode of the agent, and it is this that the habit formally existing in the power explains. This is clear with two arguments. [1] First, the ease of a power in [performing] its act is natural in things where there is no intellective appetite and only sensitive appetite (i.e. brute animals) or where there is no sensitive appetite and only intellective appetite (i.e. angels); however, in human beings where there are both appetites the ease is in virtue of a habit super-added to the power, even if it is not as great. However, the first ease [sc. in brute animals and angels] is a natural mode or condition of the power and not the act. Therefore, in us too. [2] Second, acts altogether similar in connection with their objects and intensity are easy after the habit whereas before they were hard. Therefore, the ease and hardship is not a condition of the act (which is in itself the same) but it is a condition of the agent. We support this argument with an analogy to bodies. Lifting something heavy is hard for someone who is weak and easy for someone who is strong. This hardship (as is obvious on its own) is a condition of the one doing the lifting and not of the act or the object. Likewise, in the case at hand, for the habit is a kind of perfection of the one who has it (or at least it is what removes an impediment). Since, then, this mode is not a condition of the act, as was said, it remains that it is not caused in the act neither by the habit alone (as the second opinion tells us) nor by the power together with the habit (as the first opinion has it), but it is caused in the power from the preceding acts. And perhaps this mode is nothing but the habit itself.

260 **23.** It is clear, then, how the habit is related to explaining a mode in the act, since it explains the mode which is better or worse [i.e. determination] in the manner of what inclines or, so to say, applies the power to a determinate object; and it explains the mode of intensity in the manner of what removes an impediment. Hence, in each of these modes the habit contributes to the essence of the act just as much as to the mode of the act. However, it is said that a habit is required to explain the mode and not the act since the power without the habit does not have such and so certain a determination to a determinate object, but at one point it is brought into one and at another point it is brought into another, nor does it perform the act so intensely. Nor is this distinction merely conceptual or according to adaptation,⁴⁰ but it is real, understood in this way and not as the first opinion explains it.

270 **24.** As to the arguments put forward by the second opinion—which seem to prove that a habit contributes nothing to the essence of the act—it ought to be said to the first argument that an appetitive power can [perform] any act of desiring when it is not impeded in connection with the essence of the act even without a habit. However,

⁴⁰ I.e. the denial of the appropriation thesis put forward by the first opinion.

the claim that a habit contributes nothing to the essence of an act only follows in the case of an act performed by a power that has yet to be perfected by a habit; in the case of an act performed after a habit this is not true, since a habit does not explain
 275 a mode of the act as a kind of perfection distinct from the essence of the act but it does determine the power to the object—good if it is a good habit or bad if it is a bad habit—and the power so applied performs a good or bad act (called a “modified act”). And the whole act is from the power as what performs it and from the habit as what determines and inclines the power. Also the habit explains the intensity of
 280 the act, which is not distinct from the essence of the act.

25. To the second it ought to be said that either there is no supernatural capacity (*potestas*) for consecration in us as in a subject but rather it is by divine power alone that there is an effect of any given sacrament whatsoever, or, alternatively, if there is some such [power in us], then there is no analogy between such a supernatural
 285 power and a supernatural habit (e.g. grace and charity) and a natural act and an acquired habit, for the mode that a supernatural habit explains is not the same in essence as the act of the supernatural power, but rather it is nothing but the divine approval in virtue of which our works done out of charity are meritorious. Hence, this mode can be from the habit granted that the act is not from it. However, the
 290 mode which an acquired habit explains with regard to the act of a power coincides in the same with the act, and so whatever is the cause of the one is the cause of the other.

26. To the third an answer is clear since we do not suppose that there is a merely conceptual distinction between a power and a habit but a real one, as is clear from
 295 what has been said.

Response to the opening arguments

27. As to the opening arguments, an answer is somehow already clear. For the two first arguments support our thesis, even though the first assumes something that is false, namely, that a habit is generated from the acts that come before [the habit]
 300 by reason of the essence of the acts—which is not true, but rather it is from their frequent repetition and habituation (*assuefactio*), as others [i.e. the second opinion] say, and in this they are right.

28. The second argument which states that an episode of knowing is from dispositional knowledge as second act from first can be conceded in the way in
 305 which it was conceded that the act that comes after a habit is caused by a habit, namely, in the manner of what inclines and applies the power, and not as others said before, those who draw a distinction between an act and the mode imported with the term “episode of knowing”, for such a distinction cannot be real but merely conceptual.

29. To the first argument for the other part an answer is clear, for it was explained already as to how that *dictum* of Aristotle ought to be understood—a power is that by which we can whereas a habit is that by which we can better or worse. This claim is not made for the purpose of drawing a real distinction between an act and its mode but rather because of the indifference of the power. A habit determines [the power]
 310 to one [mode]—to good if it is good; to bad if it is bad.

30. To the other argument the reply from the first opinion is sufficient.

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71

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